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A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. The DITSCAP 
Within the past ten years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has taken significant 
steps to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information located in 
their own computer systems by implementing a procedure known as certification and 
accreditation.  In December of 1997, the DoD released Instruction 5200.40 titled “DoD 
Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process”.  This 
Instruction, known as the DITSCAP, mandates that any DoD system that collects, stores, 
transmits, or processes unclassified or classified information must undergo the 
certification and accreditation process.  The necessity to perform certification and 
accreditation on all systems was reinforced when the DoD released the new Information 
Assurance policy in October of 2002.  DoDD 8500.1, which supersedes the prior DoDD 
5200.28, requires that all DoD systems be certified and accredited in accordance with 
DoD Instruction 5200.40. 
The terms certification and accreditation are used to describe the two-tiered 
process implemented by the DoD to assure that all of their computer systems are 
operating at an acceptable level of risk.  The National Security Telecommunications and 
Information Systems Security Instruction (NSTISSI) 4009 defines the two terms as 
follows: 
Certification is the comprehensive evaluation of the technical and non-
technical security features of an information system and other safeguards, 
made in support of the accreditation process, to establish the extent to 
which a particular design and implementation meets a set of specified 
security requirements. 
Accreditation is the formal declaration by a Designated Approving 
Authority that an Information System is approved to operate in a particular 
security mode using a prescribed set of safeguards at an acceptable level 
of risk. [Ref. 1] 
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In most cases, certification is performed by a Certification Authority (CA) which 
assigns either a Certification Agent, or with larger systems, a team of Certification 
Agents to evaluate the level of compliance the system has with the predefined security 
requirements.  It is the job of the CA to provide the Designated Approving Authority 
(DAA) with enough evidence to make an accreditation decision.  The DAA is the official 
with the responsibility of formally approving or disapproving a system to become 
operational based on the ability of the system to meet certain security specifications.  The 
DAA employs both the Information System Security Manger (ISSM) as principal advisor 
in Information Assurance matters and the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) to 
ensure security of the system from design to destruction.  Other key members in the 
certification and accreditation process are the User Representative and the Program 
Manager (PM).  The User Representative can be either a single person or an organization 
that speaks for the users of the system concerning the relationship/impact of security 
requirements on the operational mission.  The PM is responsible for ensuring the security 
design and the overall development of the system.  The Certification Agent, CA, DAA, 
User Representative, ISSM, and ISSO support the PM in all security related issues that 
may occur during the life-cycle of the system. 
The DITSCAP is a four-phase process that is intended to address security issues 
during every step of the computer system life cycle.  The first phase, known as the 
Definition phase, is focused on determining the mission, environment, and architecture of 
the system to identify the level of effort required for accreditation.  The level of effort is a 
measurement that weighs seven system characteristics to determine both the density of 
security safeguards needed to protect the system adequately and the amount of resources 
required to provide the DAA with a sufficient amount of information about the system to 
make an accreditation decision.  The end result of the Definition Phase is a System 
Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA) that outlines both the approach for the 
certification and accreditation effort and the security features necessary for the system at 
the predefined level of effort.  The SSAA is then signed by the DAA, the PM, the 
Certification Agent, and the User Representative, and represents a formal agreement 
between the four parties. 
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The second phase of the DITSCAP is the Verification phase.  This phase is 
implemented to provide further detail on the security requirements and their 
implementation, to revise and expand the SSAA when changes to security strategies are 
made, and to ensure compliance between the system being developed and the 
requirements agreed upon in the SSAA.  Ensuring compliance is a lengthy task that could 
involve analysis of the system architecture, software design, network design, integrated 
products such as COTS or GOTS, system vulnerabilities, and life-cycle management.  
The goal of the Verification phase is to make certain before moving on to the next phase 
that the design and development efforts have yielded a system that will prove through 
testing to be both certifiable and accreditable. 
The Validation phase of the DITSCAP includes the continuing evolution of the 
SSAA to reflect the status of the current system, certification evaluation and validation of 
the fully integrated system with the current security specifications in the SSAA, a 
possible system certification from the Certification Agent based on the compliance of the 
fully integrated system to the SSAA, and finally an accreditation decision by the DAA 
that could result in an authorization to operate for the system in question.  The intensity 
and quantity of certification evaluation tasks performed in the Validation phase depends 
in large part on the level of effort measure assigned to the certification and accreditation 
process during the Definition phase.  Certification evaluation may include system 
security testing, penetration testing, TEMPEST testing, COMSEC compliance validation, 
system management analysis, contingency plan evaluation, and a risk-based management 
review. 
If after performing these evaluation tasks the Certification Agent is satisfied that 
the system complies with the agreed-upon security requirements, the agent will certify 
the system and recommend accreditation to the DAA.  If the DAA decides to accredit the 
system, a detailed description of the operating environment and security parameters under 
which the system has been granted an authorization to operate will be provided in the 
accreditation documentation.  Conversely, if the agent denies certification, the system is 
not accredited, and the certification and accreditation process is restarted again at the 
Definition phase.  If a system is deemed to be mission critical and is required to be 
operational, an interim authorization to operate may be granted while additional security 
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safeguards are implemented.  In this scenario, it is also necessary for the system to return 
to the Definition phase to agree upon new security solutions and a schedule for 
completion.   
The Post-Accreditation phase of the DITSCAP begins after the system has been 
accredited by the DAA and fully integrated into the predefined operating environment.  
This phase consists of multiple activities that are performed to maximize the probability 
that the accredited system will continue to operate with an acceptable level of risk.  These 
activities include an ongoing effort to keep the SSAA current, evaluation of the system 
operations, change management, and compliance validation.  The evaluation of system 
operations is performed periodically by the Information System Security Officer to 
ensure that the system is operating within the parameters detailed during accreditation.  
Any significant changes to the operating environment that may affect the security posture 
of the system must be agreed upon by the four parties that signed the SSAA.  All systems 
that remain operational must be recertified and reaccredited after any major change to the 
security posture of the system occurs or following a set time frame that differs from one 
DoD department to the next.  The circumstances that trigger recertification and 
reaccreditation must be detailed in the SSAA of the system.  
2.   Risk Management 
A phrase that prominently appears in every phase of the DITSCAP is acceptable 
level of risk.  It is generally acknowledged and accepted that every system operates with 
multiple risks at any given time because monetary constraints and the nature of software 
make it impossible to eliminate all risk.  The NSTISSI 4009 defines risk as follows: 
A combination of the likelihood that a threat will occur, the likelihood that 
a threat occurrence will result in an adverse impact, and the severity of the 
resulting impact. [Ref. 1] 
The amount of risk that is regarded as acceptable varies from system to system 
based on many factors including mission criticality, the classification level of 
information, and the potential impact the execution of the risk could inflict on the  
5 
organization.  Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the DAA to decide whether the level 
of risk is acceptable after reviewing the risk management results documented by the 
Certification Agent. 
Risk management is a constant process and an inexact science that seeks a 
balance between the cost to protect an information system and the value of the assets to 
be protected.  The job of risk management is to identify risks, assess them for their 
potential impact, and implement security safeguards that are economically feasible for the 
assets being protected.  Risk management is a two phase process that consists of risk 
assessment and risk mitigation.  Risk assessment is the first phase of risk management 
and consists of all the procedures responsible for identifying risks and their potential 
impact.  Risk mitigation then utilizes the results found during risk assessment to apply 
controls and minimize risk wherever possible.  These two processes are performed many 
times throughout the development of a system and combine to make risk management an 
essential procedure for establishing an acceptable level of risk within the DITSCAP. 
Risk management is an iterative process that is performed by the Certification 
Agent at every stage of the system life-cycle, and consequently, every phase of the 
DITSCAP.  During the Definition phase, a conceptual assessment is done to examine the 
security of the system design.  A preliminary assessment is completed during the 
Verification phase to evaluate the security of the system during development and 
integration.  A residual assessment is performed during the Validation phase to determine 
which risks remain after the countermeasures have been applied following the previous 
phases and before integration.  After the system has been accredited, periodic compliance 
reviews are performed to ensure that the security of the system in the present operating 
environment maintains an acceptable level of risk.  The results obtained from early life-
cycle stages are used by subsequent stages for risk mitigation and risk is gradually 
decreased as a cumulative effect through the development of the system.  When risk 
management is performed after the system is fully integrated into the operating 




3.   DoN Implementation 
The Department of the Navy (DoN) developed the Naval Information Assurance 
Publication (IA Pub) 5239 series to provide guidance, procedures, and processes for 
implementing the DoN Information Assurance Program.  Several modules in this series 
were written specifically to address information security (INFOSEC) issues.  Because the 
DoD encompasses all branches of the military, the DoN is required to apply the 
DITSCAP to all Navy information systems.  IA Pub 5239-13 is a three-volume module 
that pertains exclusively to the certification and accreditation process.  Volume one 
introduces and summarizes the certification and accreditation process that is detailed in 
the DITSCAP and briefly describes the contents and uses for Volume two and Volume 
three.  Volume two describes the certification and accreditation process that the DoN 
prescribes for systems that require only a basic level of information assurance.  IA Pub 
5239-01 defines five levels of information systems based on mission criticality and 
function.  Of these five levels, Administrative and Mission Support systems generally 
only require completion of the certification and accreditation checklist provided in 
Volume two to satisfy the demands of the DITSCAP.  Volume three details the 
certification and accreditation process designated for systems that necessitate more 
stringent levels of information assurance.  This process applies to information systems 
defined by IA Pub 5239-01 to be either Mission Critical Category 1, 2, or 3. 
IA Pub 5239-16 is the DoN Risk Assessment Guidebook that was developed to 
provide a standardized approach to assessing the level of risk in DoN information 
systems.  This module of the 5239 series is intended for Certification Agents preparing 
the risk analysis appendix of the SSAA used by the DAA in the accreditation decision.  If 
possible, the procedures in this module are to be used during every stage of the system 
life-cycle.  However, for obvious reasons, it is possible that a Certification Agent will be 
unable to complete risk assessment during the design and development stages when 
certifying an operational system.  The system administration guide should include the 
appropriate procedures for configuring the system to meet the criteria in the checklist.  IA 
Pub 5239-16 implements a six-step process that consists of System Characterization, 
Threat Identification, Vulnerability Identification, Risk Analysis, Countermeasure 
Recommendations, and Assessment Results Documentation. 
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System Characterization defines the scope of the risk assessment effort by 
thoroughly identifying and documenting all technical and non-technical elements located 
inside the boundary of the information system.  The documented results from System 
Characterization are used for analysis in every other step of the DoN risk assessment 
process.  In some cases, the Certification Agent will find much of the needed information 
already assembled in the SSAA of the system.  IA Pub 5239-16 suggests that at minimum 
the following information be collected: 
• Hardware Components 
• Software 
• Internal and external system interfaces 
• Data and information stored, processed, transferred, and used in the 
system 
• Support personnel 
• Users and their organizations 
• The mission of the system 
• The business processes the system performs 
• The value or importance of the system and its data to the organization 
• The classification and sensitivity of the system 
• Documentation of system requirements 
• Governing security policies 
• System diagrams and flow charts 
• Descriptions of the physical and environment security measures that will 
be in place 
The Threat Identification and Vulnerability Identification steps are performed in 
parallel and the results from these two steps are used as input for Risk Analysis.  During 
Threat Identification, the Certification Agent is responsible for identifying any potential 
situation that may disrupt the system, and consequently, impair the mission or personnel 
that the system supports.  The NSTISSI 4009 defines a threat as follows: 
Any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm to an IT 
system in the form of destruction, disclosure, adverse modification of the 
data, and/or denial of service. [Ref. 1] 
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The Certification Agent must document any potential natural, human, or 
environmental threat and approximate the likelihood of that occurrence happening and 
having an adverse affect on the system with the current amount of security safeguards.  
The Certification Agent must also estimate the motivation, resources, and capabilities 
necessary to execute a successful attack for each of the possible human threats.  The IA 
Pub 5239-16 lists the following as examples of potential threat-agents: 
• Floods, earthquakes, landslides, or hurricanes 
• Human errors, including mistakes made while entering data into a system 
• Human negligence 
• Deliberate attempts to circumvent or damage a system and/or the security 
countermeasures designed to protect it 
• Malicious code, such as viruses and Trojan horses 
• Attempts to access information without proper authorization 
• Long-term power failures 
• Failure of building infrastructure components, such as burst water pipes or 
leaking roofs 
During Vulnerability Identification, the Certification Agent must identify all 
potential flaws in the system.  The NSTISSI 4009 defines a vulnerability as follows: 
Any weakness in an information system, or cryptographic system, or 
components (e.g., system security procedures, hardware design, internal 
controls) that could be exploited. [Ref. 1] 
The Certification Agent may take advantage of several valuable resources when 
searching for system vulnerabilities including government and vendor security advisories, 
previous risk assessment documentation, and system usage and audit reports.  The 
Information Assurance Vulnerability Management (IAVM) process was developed by the 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) in an effort to track all intentional or 
unintentional attempts to exploit DoD systems and they provide the Certification Agent 
with a powerful database consisting of known system flaws.  The search for 
vulnerabilities is not limited to hardware and software flaws and may include weaknesses 
in procedures, policy, and configuration. 
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Risk Analysis is the longest and most demanding portion of the risk assessment 
process and relies heavily upon the results generated from System Characterization, 
Threat Identification, and Vulnerability Identification.  The Certification Agent must 
determine the probability of exploitation for every possible threat and vulnerability 
combination and examine the potential impact the exploitation would have on the system, 
the information, the mission, and national security.  IA Pub 5239-16 lists the four key 
factors for obtaining this information as criticality of the system and its data, the 
likelihood of successful exploitation, the magnitude of the impact of an attack, and the 
assigned level of risk. 
Criticality of the system and its data is a rating that is used to measure the 
significance the system and information have to the mission, users, and organization.  
The rating is obtained by assessing the affect a compromise to the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the system would have on the overall mission.  A high rating 
denotes a system that is absolutely essential to all or part of the mission and may imply 
the presence of information that could cause dire consequences if compromised by an 
enemy.  A medium rating represents a system that is very important to an organization, 
but the mission could be completed with the implementation of expensive contingency 
plans following a system compromise.  A low rating signifies a system that would cause 
minimal burden to the mission in the event of system loss or degradation.  A high 
criticality rating generally corresponds to an adversary having increased motivation to 
attack the system.  Therefore, the criticality rating is an important factor in deciding the 
amount of security safeguards an information system requires. 
The second factor involved in accomplishing the goals of the Risk Analysis step 
is assessing and rating the likelihood of successful exploitation.  The Certification Agent 
examines each threat and vulnerability combination to determine how likely the scenario 
is to occur.  A success probability is established by evaluating the relationship between 
the availability of resources required to exploit a vulnerability, a threat-agent’s 
motivation to exploit that vulnerability, and the planned or existing technical and non-
technical countermeasures intended to repel an attack. A high rating represents a scenario 
that requires a minimal level of effort by the attacker or a motivated and capable 
adversary with the means to exploit a vulnerability.  A medium rating represents a 
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situation that requires moderate effort and an attacker with considerable resources and 
motivation.  A low rating signifies a system that has the proper safeguards implemented 
to defend an attacker or the adversary lacks the resources or motivation to exploit the 
vulnerability.   
Magnitude of the impact of an attack is a rating used to determine the affect a 
successful exploit of a vulnerability may have on the mission.  The impact is based on the 
loss of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability of the system and 
information.  Confidentiality is defined as the assurance that information is not disclosed 
to unauthorized persons, processes, or devices.  Integrity is the assurance that information 
is consistent and has not been altered intentionally or unintentionally by someone or 
something without proper privileges.  Availability is the assurance that the system and the 
data can be accessed by authorized users in an acceptable amount of time.  
Accountability provides assurance that all activities occurring on a system can be traced 
unquestionably to a source or a user.  A high rating represents an attack that significantly 
impacts the system and could result in serious injury or death to the users of the system.  
A medium rating signifies an attack that could temporarily have a serious impact on the 
system.  A low rating represents an attack that is easily detected and corrected without 
any lasting or negative affect on the system.  A magnitude rating should be given to each 
threat and vulnerability combination. 
The Certification Agent uses the previous three factors in determining the 
assigned level of risk for each threat and vulnerability combination.  The results of these 
combinations are compared against a two-dimensional matrix that is constructed with the 
likelihood of exploitation ratings as the columns and the magnitude of impact ratings for 
the rows.  Cells in the matrix that represent a high likelihood and a high magnitude 
combination are labeled with a high assigned level of risk.  As the risk of exploitation and 
magnitude decrease, so to does the assigned level of risk rating.  The Certification Agent 
initially assigns each threat and vulnerability combination an assigned level of risk based 
on the matrix and refines the rating based on factors such as past experience, criticality 
rating, and data classification. 
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In the next step of the risk assessment process, the Certification Agent is 
responsible for recommending necessary countermeasures to lower risk to a level 
acceptable for accreditation.  The Certification Agent must work with the PM to 
implement the appropriate safeguards.  Cost benefit analysis should be performed for 
every recommended countermeasure to weigh the cost of the safeguard against the 
expected improvement to the system.  IA Pub 5239-16 lists the following as possible 
areas for security controls: 
• Organizational policy and procedures 
• Operational management 
• Technical countermeasures 
• Procedural 
• Any other additional tools 
The final step of the risk assessment process is developing the Assessment Results 
Documentation that is included as an appendix of the system SSAA and reviewed by the 
DAA during the accreditation decision.  This documentation should be as thorough as 
possible because it will be referenced often in the continuing effort to manage the level of 
risk.  The documentation will include the risk assessment approach, a threat statement, a 
detailed description and the recommended countermeasures for each finding, and the 
statement of risk.  The statement of risk is the last section of the report and describes the 
overall level of risk in the system.  This statement is prepared by the Certification Agent 
by evaluating the current vulnerabilities and countermeasures present in the system and 
assigning an aggregate level of risk.   
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
1.   Scope 
The Naval Postgraduate School is a part of both the Department of Defense and 
the Department of the Navy.  Because of these affiliations, the Naval Postgraduate 
School and its computer systems must strictly adhere to the technical security policies 
implemented by both organizations.  In particular, DoDD 8500.1 mandates that all 
computer systems operated by the Naval Postgraduate School must complete the 
procedures and processes of DoDI 5200.40, otherwise know as certification and 
accreditation.  Further, the certification and accreditation process in regards to the Naval 
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Postgraduate School and its systems must follow the guidelines outlined in the DoN IA 
Pub 5239 series.  More precisely, the three-volume 5239-13 module deals specifically 
with the requirements detailed in DoDI 5200.40.   
Both the DoDI 5200.40 and the DoN IA Pub 5239-13 require risk analysis to be 
performed during all four phases of certification and accreditation and every life cycle 
stage of a system.  DoN IA Pub 5239-16 was explicitly developed to assist the 
certification team in performing a risk assessment on a DoN System.  The Naval 
Postgraduate School campus network is currently undergoing the certification and 
accreditation process and therefore must also be thoroughly examined for all existing and 
potential risk before being certified and accredited.  This thesis will examine the current 
security posture of the Naval Postgraduate School network by performing each of the six 
steps included in the DoN IA Pub 5239-16 guide to risk assessment.  The six steps 
included in the DoN risk assessment process are as follows:   
• System Characterization  
• Threat Identification  
• Vulnerability Identification  
• Risk Analysis  
• Countermeasure Recommendations  
• Assessment Results Documentation   
This research will thoroughly examine the current Naval Postgraduate School 
Gigabit Network security posture, identify any possible threats or vulnerabilities, and 
recommend any appropriate safeguards that may be necessary to counter the found 
threats and vulnerabilities.  The research will include any portion of computer security, 
physical security, personnel security, and communication security that may be applicable 
to the overall security of the campus network.  The goal is to ensure that the campus 
network is operating with the proper amount of security safeguards to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity from both insider and outsider 
threats.  Risk analysis will be performed by assessing all of the possible threats 
vulnerabilities to determine the likelihood of exploitation and the potential impact the 
exploitation could have on the system, the information, and the mission of the Naval  
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Postgraduate School.  The results of the risk assessment performed on the network may 
be used by the Designated Approving Authority of the Naval Postgraduate School 
Gigabit network when deciding whether to accredit the system. 
2.   Research Questions 
In an effort to identify all of the current and potential risks associated with the 
Naval Postgraduate School Campus network, this paper will attempt to answer the 
following questions: 
• Why must the NPS campus network undergo such a rigorous risk 
assessment process? 
• How is the NPS campus network currently set up and configured?  
• What is the DoD Level of Effort requirement for the network? 
• What is the DoD Mission Assurance Category for the network? 
• How does the current network configuration relate to the overall security? 
• What is the current security posture of the NPS campus network? 
• What are the current vulnerabilities of the network? 
• What are the current threats to the network? 
• What are the inside threats? 
• What are the outside threats? 
• What are the most likely vulnerabilities and threats for an attacker to 
potentially exploit? 
• What impact would the exploitation of these vulnerabilities and threats 
have on the system, information, and mission? 
• What safeguards and countermeasures can be implemented to reduce the 
risk of these vulnerabilities and threats from being exploited? 
• Does the network meet the minimum security requirements for operation 
at the pre-determined Level of Effort and Mission Assurance Category? 
• Should the Designated Approving Authority accredit the system? 
3.   Research Objectives 
The overall objective of this research is to provide the key participants of the 
certification and accreditation process with information that will help them to determine 
the resources needed to protect the system adequately, to implement countermeasures 
required to secure the NPS campus network properly, and to reach an accreditation 
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decision.  The ISSM will be able to implement the countermeasure recommendations to 
strengthen the security of the network. The Certification Agent will be able to focus on 
the areas of the system that may require some extra attention.  Finally, the DAA will be 
able to combine the information provided by this report, the complete security details 
located in the SSAA, and the advice given by the Certification Agent to make an 
educated accreditation decision.  The goal is to ensure that the NPS campus network is 
equipped with enough security safeguards to protect the system from all inside and 
outside threats and to maintain the impeccable reputation of the Department of Defense 
and Department of the Navy. 
C.   ORGANIZATION OF PAPER 
This paper will be organized much like the recommended output of IA Pub 5239-
16.  However, there have been some minor changes made in the outline of the report in 
an effort to clarify the most important findings of the risk assessment.  The Vulnerability 
Identification and the Risk Analysis chapters have been combined to increase the 
effectiveness of the results and to facilitate the implementation of the countermeasures.  
Also, because this report will not actually be attached as an appendix to the official 
SSAA, the Assessment Results Documentation will be presented in a less formal manner 
and will be located in the Countermeasure and Conclusion chapters.  First, the network 
and the security posture will be thoroughly examined during the System Characterization 
chapter.  Second, the threats facing the NPS campus network will be detailed in the 
Threat Identification chapter.  Next, the vulnerabilities will be presented with a risk 
analysis that will examine the likelihood, magnitude, and overall risk each of the 
vulnerabilities may have on the mission of the Naval Postgraduate School.  Finally, the 
recommended countermeasures to strengthen the security of the network will be given.  
The complete outline of the paper is as follows: 
• Introduction 
• Historical Background 
• Purpose of Study 
• Scope 
• Research Questions 
• Research Objectives 
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• Organization of Paper 
• System Characterization 
• Identify resources and information that constitute the system and 
its boundaries 
• Define the scope of the Risk Assessment Effort 
• Document all pertinent factors 
• Hardware  
• Software 
• Server Farms 
• Internal and external system interfaces 
• .mil and .edu 
• Data and information stored, processed, transferred, and 
used in the system 
• Support Personnel 
• Users and their organizations 
• The mission of the system 
• The business processes the system performs 
• The value or importance of the system and its data to the 
organization 
• The classification and sensitivity of the system 
• System flow charts 
• Define Level of Effort 
• Define Mission Assurance Category 
• Threat Identification 
• Define all possible circumstances or events that could potentially 
cause harm to the system 
• Vulnerability Identification and Risk Analysis 
• Define all possible Vulnerabilities that could potentially be 
exploited 
• Describe tools used to detect vulnerabilities 
• Describe the criticality of the system and its data 
• Estimate the likelihood of successful exploitation of each 
vulnerability 
• Estimate the magnitude of the impact of each attack 
• Assign a level of risk to each potential attack 
• Countermeasure Recommendations 
16 






• Initial Distribution List 
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II. SYSTEM CHARACTERIZATION 
A.   HARDWARE 
The physical design and structure of the NPS network reflects the expansive 
layout of the campus.  NPS has an open campus that consists of over twenty academic, 
administration, utility, and family housing buildings (See Figure 1).  From these 
buildings, ten academic and administration complexes, the La Mesa Family Housing 
Center, and the Public Works Complex are connected to the NPS network.  The logical 
design of the network was dependent on the conflicting requirements of the military and 
university aspects of NPS.  Each of the connected buildings contains various amounts and 
types of hardware and software components that are configured to handle this intricate 
dichotomy present at NPS. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Campus Map 
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The NPS network was divided into two separate domains, .mil and .edu, in an 
attempt to satisfy the special requirements that exist from supporting both a military base 
and a university.  The separation was accomplished by creating two distinct external 
connections to the Internet (See Figure 2) and by partitioning Virtual Local Area 
Networks (VLANs) throughout the network for both the .mil and .edu hosts.  The .mil 
domain, dedicated to the military needs of NPS, has a Class B IP range with host number 
131.120.X.X.  The .edu domain, dedicated to the university needs of NPS, has a private 
IP space and will implement Network Address Translation (NAT) in order to access the 
Internet.  Because of the large number of foreign national students attending NPS, it was 
necessary to place some type of control on which students were accessing United States 
government websites containing sensitive but unclassified information.  In the future, any 
person or service that is logged onto a .mil or .edu host will also be required to 
authenticate at a proxy server that will be located in the DMZ in order to access restricted 
sites that require a .mil domain name.  Also, all communication between the two domains 
that originates from the .edu domain will be required to authenticate through a VPN/SSL.   
The central portion and backbone of the NPS network and the vast majority of the 
Information Technology staff are located in Ingersoll Hall at the Data Center.  All 
inbound, outbound, and inter-building traffic travels through the hardware in this 
building.  The Data Center contains all of the following hardware components (See 
Figure 3): 
• Three BigIron 8000 backbone switches  
• Two BigIron 4000 backbone switches  
• One Server farm for each domain comprising of approximately one-
hundred and forty servers 
• Router Rack 
• .mil domain 
• Two 75xx Cisco Routers  
• Cisco Pix Firewall 
• Two 3Com 3300 Switches 
• Three Intrusion Detection Machines 
• Snortnet (2) 
• Stealthwatch 
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• .edu domain 
• Cisco 7200 Router 






















Figure 2.   Separate Domains of NPS Network. 
 
The NPS campus network has a three-tiered hierarchy of switch classes that 
increase in speed and capability as data flows towards the interior of the network. The 
center of the network consists of the three BigIron 8000 layer three backbone switches, 
which are the fastest of the switches implemented at NPS.  The BigIron 8000 switches 
are directly connected through fiber optic lines to the twelve BigIron 4000 layer three 
switches located throughout the campus and to all of the servers in the two Server Farms.   
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The BigIron 8000 switches are responsible for forwarding all of the traffic on the 
network, except for intra-building communications, which are handled by the local 
BigIron 4000 switches in each building.  
 
Ingersoll Router Rack
BigIron 4000FO U ND RY
NETWORKS BigIron 4000FO U ND R YNETWORKS
Server Farm
BigIron 8000FOU N DR YN E T W O R K SBigIron 8000FOU N DR YN E T W O R K S
Ingersoll Data Center
BigIron 8000F OUN DR YN E T W O R K S
Server Farm
 
Figure 3.   Data Center 
 
The majority of the BigIron 4000 switches are dedicated to either an entire 
networked campus building, a portion of a networked campus building, or an academic 
department.  There is one BigIron 4000 switch located at all of the network connected 
academic and administration buildings except for Herrmann Hall, Spanagel Hall, and 
Ingersoll Hall.  Because the Computer Science Department is located in Spanagel Hall 
and has its own BigIron 4000 switch, this building has two BigIron 4000 switches.  There 
are also two BigIron 4000 switches that divide Hermann hall into two separate VLANs.   
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The BigIron 4000 switches combine to break the campus network into eleven 
logically separated VLANs (See Figure 4).  The Data Center in Ingersoll Hall, as 
documented earlier, contains two BigIron 4000 switches.  One of these switches is 
dedicated to communications to and from the router rack and the other BigIron 4000 is 
responsible for connecting the local host machines as in the other buildings.  The La 
Mesa Family Housing Center and the Public Works Complex are joined to the network as 
subnets and are directly connected by a fiber optic line to either the gateway router or to 


































Figure 4.   Eleven VLANs. 
 
Each of the BigIron 4000 switches dedicated to a building or department is 
connected to a series of FastIron Edge 4802 or 3Com SuperStack 3300 layer two 
switches that separate each building or department into smaller VLANs and connect the 
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host machines of each building to the network.  Because each of the connected buildings 
requires a different number of host machines, there are a varying number of VLANs and 
FastIron or 3Com switches located in each building.  Also, each building has a varying 
number of VLANs associated with both the .mil and .edu domains.  The names of the 
connected buildings, the number of total VLANs per building, the names of each VLAN, 
and the exact type and amount of switches per VLAN are as follows: 
• Bullard Hall (See Figure 5) 
• 3 VLANs 
• Bullard 100a 
• 1 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Bullard 125 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Bullard 212 
• 3 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Glasgow Hall (See Figure 6) 
• 7 VLANS 
• Glasgow 0H9 
• 1 FastIron Edge 4802 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Glasgow 2B2 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Glasgow 295 
• 3 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Glasgow 2H9 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Glasgow 3B2 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Glasgow 3B9 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Glasgow 3H9 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Halligan Hall (See Figure 7) 
• 4 VLANs 
• Halligan 028 
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• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Halligan 103c 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Halligan 201c 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Halligan 255 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Herrmann Hall 220 (See Figure 8) 
• 5 VLANs 
• Herrmann 028 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Herrmann 069 
• 3 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Herrmann M8b 
• 3 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Herrmann 136a 
• 3 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Herrmann 416 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Herrmann Hall 221 (See Figure 9) 
• 5 VLANs 
• HerrmannE 114 
• 1 FastIron Edge 4802 
• HerrmannE 204 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• HerrmannE 214 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• HerrmannE 316 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• HermmanE 506 
• 1 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Herrmann Hall 222 (See Figure 10) 
• 2 VLANs 
• HerrmannW 115 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
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• HerrmannW 506 
• 1 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Ingersoll Hall (See Figure 11) 
• 4 VLANs 
• Ingersoll 149 
• 4 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Ingersoll 279 
• 4 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Ingersoll 365 
• 5 FastIron Edge 4802 
• CEE Garage 
• 1 3Com 4900SX 
• 8 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• King Hall 
• 1 VLAN 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Knox Library (See Figure 12) 
• 5 VLANS 
• Knox 109 
• 1 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Knox 152 
• 1 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Knox 169 
• 1 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Knox 209 
• 1 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Knox 265 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• ME Building (See Figure 13) 
• 3 VLANs 
• ME Garage 
• 1 FastIron Edge 4802 
• ME 2nd Floor 
• 3 FastIron Edge 4802 
• ME Annex 
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• 4 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Root Hall (See Figure 14) 
• 5 VLANs 
• Root 107c 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Root 123 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Root 200a 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Root 220 
• 7 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Root 268 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Spanagel Hall (See Figure 15) 
• 7 VLANs 
• Spanagel 032 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Spanagel 132 
• 3 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Spanagel 234 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Spanagel 303a 
• 4 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Spanagel 338 
• 5 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Spanagel 440 
• 4 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Spanagel 538 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Computer Science Department (See Figure 16) 
• 3 VLANS 
• Spanagel 259 
• 4 FastIron Edge 4802 
• Spanagel 500 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
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• Spanagel 523 
• 2 FastIron Edge 4802 
• CEE Garage (See Figure 17) 
• 8 VLANS 
• Qtrs B 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Qtrs C 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Qtrs E 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Qtrs F 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Qtrs G 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Qtrs H 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Qtrs I 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Qtrs J 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• La Mesa Housing Center (See Figure 18) 
• 5 VLANS 
• Self Help Barn 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Youth Center 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Family Services 
• 2 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• 1283 Leahy 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Community Center 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Publics Works Complex (See Figure 19) 
• 5 VLANS 
• Building 427 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
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• Building 428 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Building 436 
• 2 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Building 437 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
• Building 349 
• 1 3Com SuperStack 3300 
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Figure 6.   Glasgow Hall. 
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Figure 8.   Herrmann Hall 220. 
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Figure 10.   Herrmann Hall 222. 
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Figure 12.   Knox Library. 
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Figure 14.   Root Hall. 
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Figure 15.   Spanagel Hall. 
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Figure 16.   Computer Science Department. 
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Figure 18.   La Mesa Housing Center. 
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Figure 19.   Public Works Complex. 
 
B. SOFTWARE 
The current server farm consists of over one-hundred forty servers that are 
responsible for hosting various applications and services.  In the future, the server farm 
will be split into two distinct server farms to represent both the .mil and .edu domains.  
However, at the present time all of the servers that make up the campus network belong 
to one server farm.  The server farm is centralized at the Ingersoll Hall Data Center, but 
there are some servers located sporadically across the campus belonging to various 
departments, students, or faculty. The overwhelming majority of the servers are running 
Windows 2000 Server Advanced, Windows 2000 Server, or Windows NT Server 4.0.  
However, there is a small number of servers running Unix.  The following list details the 
different types and amount of servers attached to the network (See Appendix A): 
• Autocad Server (1) 
• Backup and Data Restores (1) 
• Citrix Servers (7) 
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• Defense Messaging Server (1) 
• Domain Controllers (4) 
• DORS Development Server (2) 
• EHF Server (1) 
• EWS Server (1) 
• Exchange Server (8) 
• Fastdata Server (2) 
• File Servers (8) 
• Financial/Accounting Server (1) 
• Landesk Server (3) 
• Maximo Server (1) 
• MS Windows Updater Server (1) 
• Network Attached Storage Servers (5) 
• Norton Antivirus Servers (3) 
• OAPIWeb Server (1) 
• Python Web Management Server (1) 
• Ras Server (1) 
• Remedy Server (1) 
• Samba Server(2) 
• SQL Servers (3) 
• Web Servers (3) 
• WINS Server (1)   
• Library Management Servers (6) 
• Miscellaneous Servers (64) 
C.   EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CONNECTIONS 
The partition of the Naval Postgraduate School campus network into two separate 
domains has necessitated two distinct external network connections and an internal 
connection to handle communications between the two domains.  The .mil domain has an 
external connection to the DREN network and the .edu domain has an external 
connection to the CALREN network.  The internal connection between the two domains 
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will be handled by a VPN/SSL that will manage communications from one domain to 
another via an Active Directory type access control mechanism.   
The creation of two separate external connections has also caused the need for 
multiple sets of security mechanisms to protect and monitor both domains.  The filtering 
capabilities of the external gateway routers for both domains provide the first level of 
defense from both outside and inside threats.  For the .mil domain, a Cisco Pix firewall 
has been implemented to mediate all inbound and outbound traffic to the DREN network.  
Also, there are two separate intrusion detection systems, Snortnet and Stealthwatch, 
located on a mirrored port that dynamically examine all communications entering and 
exiting the .mil domain.  For the .edu domain, there has been a Netscreen firewall 
employed to filter the inbound and outbound traffic to the CALREN network.  The .edu 
web server is positioned in the DMZ and is located inside the external gateway to 
CALREN, but outside the Netscreen firewall.  The web server will be adequately 
hardened to protect itself from any malicious outside communications that would 
normally be detected and filtered by the firewall. 
The .mil firewall, .edu firewall, and the VPN/SSL that mediates communications 
between the two domains must adhere to the rules described in the Navy-Marine Corps 
Unclassified Trusted Network Protection policy (UTNProtect).  The policy dictates that 
all firewalls protecting trusted Navy or Marine Corps networks must implement a deny-
by-default posture.  The policy also lists a minimum set of baseline firewall configuration 
settings that determine what services, ports, and protocols are authorized for transmission 
from a trusted network to an untrusted network.  The baseline settings are not to be used 
as a default and the DAA for each site must determine if all of the settings are necessary 
(See Appendix A).  Because both the .mil and .edu domains adhere to the UTNProtect 
policy, special permission does not need to be given by CNO N6/HQMC C4 prior to the 
implementation of the VPN/SSL.  However, all VPN requests between the two domains 
must be in accordance with the baseline settings detailed in the policy.  Because the NPS 
campus network is a Navy-Marine Corps Intranet connected system, the UTNProtect 
policy is comprehensive enough to encompass all of the Ports, Protocols, and Services 
policy. 
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The Defense Management Data Center (DMDC) located at Fort Ord is joined to 
the NPS campus network as a subnet and has a direct connection to the external router of 
the .mil domain.  DMDC currently accesses the NPS campus network through this subnet 
for two separate applications.  The DIRS application communicates with several servers 
at NPS to deposit and query information.  Currently, this communication is sent back and 
forth in the clear without the implementation of a VPN.  The BIDS application also 
communicates with several servers at NPS, but a VPN is used to encrypt data in 
transmission.  The host machines at DMDC that are connected to the NPS subnet are 
housed inside a facility with strict physical security.  No access is permitted inside the 
building without the escort of a cleared DMDC employee.  Therefore, it is extremely 
unlikely the NPS host machines located at DMDC will be accessed by improper 
personnel. 
D.   SYSTEM CRITICALITY 
The Naval Postgraduate School campus network provides students and faculty the 
resources required for education and research.  Each student and member of the faculty is 
allocated a network account, which includes data storage and use of software applications 
for various tasks such as word processing, presentations, creation and compilation of 
programs, and any other reasonable tools necessary for the learning process.  The campus 
network also provides students and faculty a connection to the Internet to perform 
research and utilize information found outside of the .mil or .edu domains.  Because of 
the benign nature of the activities performed by the users of the NPS network, all data 
posted or displayed at NPS is categorized as unclassified.   
Users of the NPS network are either members of the faculty, NPS employees, or 
military or civilian students.  Each user must be granted access to the system on an 
individual basis by the proper system administrators.  Because of the data classification 
level, a special clearance is not required.  However, if a clearance is required it will be set 
by the proper corresponding departement at NPS.  The large number of foreign military 
students has created the need to mediate access to government websites that contain 
need-to-know information.  To obatain an IP address from the .mil class B pool that 
would allow access to sensitive government sites, a user must either be logged on to a  
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.mil host machine or pass through the access control mechanism of the VPN/SSL.  Also, 
in the future, each user on either the .mil or .edu domain will need to authenticate through 
a proxy server to gain access to sites that require a .mil domain name. 
The NPS network has a Mission Assurance Category (MAC) III rating. The 
system handles information that is necessary for the conduct of day-to-day business, but 
does not materially affect support to deployed or contingency forces in the short term.  
The consequences of loss of integrity or availability can be tolerated or overcome without 
significant impacts on mission effectiveness or operational readiness.  The consequences 
could include the delay or degradation of services or commodities enabling routine 
activities.  As discussed, the classification level of data located in the NPS network is 
unclassified.  Also, a compromise of the NPS campus network would not result in the 
loss of life, injury, or severely hinder the overall mission of the Naval Postgraduate 
School.  The most damaging consequence of a successful attack against the NPS network 
would be the resulting negative impact to the reputation of the Department of the Navy, 
Department of Defense, and in turn, the competency of the United States Government.  
For this reason, the NPS campus network requires a MAC III rating as opposed to being 
labeled an administrative or mission support site. 
E.   CONTINGENCY PLAN 
The Tivoli Backup and Recovery Storage Manager has been implemented to 
serve as the system backup tool for the NPS campus network.  The Tivoli manager by 
default performs backups with a system known as one full and incremental forever.  With 
this system, Tivoli will create a full backup the first time a particular server or file is 
scheduled for backup.  After the first time, an incremental backup is performed for the 
remainder of the time the server is associated with Tivoli.  However, the Tivoli manager 
at NPS has been configured to perform a new full backup on a monthly basis.  The 
amount of incremental backups saved by Tivoli is completely dependent on the policy 
that was created for the particular file or server by the system administrator.  Once the 
threshold dictated in the policy for a file or server has been reached for incremental 
backups, the oldest incremental backup is discarded. 
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At NPS, the Tivoli manager is running on the NDSM1 server that has a 
connection to both the NPS campus network and the server where the backups are cached 
until written to tape.  The server responsible for caching the backups has a terabyte 
capacity that is distributed over five physical disks.  The write to the taped backups is 
triggered by either reaching the predetermined capacity threshold for one of the physical 
disks or the daily schedule maintained by the Tivoli manager (See Figure 20).  Currently, 
there is no offsite storage for completed backup tapes.  
 
Tape drive Tape drive
Cached Backup Cached Backup Cached BackupCached Backup Cached Backup
.edu Server Farm .mil Server Farm
NDSM1
 
Figure 20.   Tivoli Manager. 
 
F.   LEVEL OF EFFORT 
The level of effort measurement was determined by examining seven system 
characteristics of the NPS campus network.  The measurement will be used to establish 
both the density of security safeguards needed to adequately protect the system and the 
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amount of resources required to provide the DAA with a sufficient amount of information 
about the system to make an accreditation decision.  The seven characteristics included in 
the level of effort are as follows: 
• Interfacing Mode 
• Processing Mode 
• Attribution Mode 
• Mission Reliance 
• Availability 
• Integrity 
• Information Categories 
Because the Naval Postgraduate School is an academic institution, most of these 
categories received a very low rating.  For example, the integrity and availability of the 
network do not significantly impact the ability of the school to continue educational 
procedures.  However, because the NPS network interacts with both the DREN and 
CALREN networks, the interfacing mode received the highest possible rating (See Table 
1).  After calculating scores for each of the characteristics, the total score combined with 
the necessity to protect the reputation of the school yielded the requirement for basic 
assurance.  The basic assurance rating dictates that the NPS campus network should 
implement at minimum the following safeguards: 
• Minimal Security Checklist 
• Auditing 
• Access control 
• Identification and Authentication 
• Network vulnerability tool 
• EAL 1 or 2 rating 
• Small amount of documentation and resources dedicated to information 
security 







Characteristic Alternatives and Weights Weight 
Interfacing Mode Benign 6 
Processing Mode Dedicated 1 
Attribution Mode Rudimentary 1 
Mission-Reliance Cursory 1 
Availability Reasonable 1 
Integrity Approximate 3 
Information Categories Unclassified 1 
 Total of all weights 14 
 
Table 1. Basic Assurance Rating. 
 
G.   SUPPORT PERSONNEL 
The NPS campus network is supported and maintained by three separate 
departments.  The Network Operation Center department is responsible for the day-to-
day operations of every aspect of the network.  The Infrastructure department is 
responsible for installing cabling and access ports and for any small remodeling projects 
that may occur.  The Security Department and Network Security Group closely interact 
with the other departments to ensure that the proper security mechanisms are 
implemented and working correctly.  Also, the Security Department performs defensive 
tasks such as vulnerability scanning and assessments.  The breakdown of personnel for 
each department is as follows: 
• Network Operations Center 
• 7 employees 
• Infrastructure Department 
• 2 employees 
• Security Department 
• 2 employees 
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III. THREAT IDENTIFICATION 
A.   OVERVIEW 
The diverse demographics of the user population and the dynamic geographic 
location of the Naval Postgraduate School present the campus network with some unique 
threat possibilities specific to NPS.  Because many of the students that attend NPS are 
military members of foreign countries, the likelihood and magnitude of a malicious 
insider attack increases dramatically.  Also, NPS is located on the California shoreline, 
which drastically increases the chances of both a substantial earthquake and ocean swells 
that could cause damaging flooding.  In the event of these threats coming to fruition, the 
likelihood of other potential threats, such as power loss and system failure, also increases.   
There are also many threats to the NPS campus network that are not unique and 
that are present in nearly all DoD systems.  NPS is a United States government funded 
university and is therefore a potential target of terrorist groups and political activists that 
carry a grudge against the country.  Also, NPS must mitigate the risk associated with 
human error and negligence in the same manner as any other DoD system.  These are just 
a few of the many possible threats facing NPS that must be both acknowledged and 
diminished through the implementation of security safeguards.  The following is a list of 
potential threat categories present at NPS that will be further examined: 
• Insider threat 
• Outsider threat 
• Environmental events 
• Support Breakdown 
B.   INSIDER THREATS 
The term insider refers to any authorized personnel who may have access to the 
NPS network and an insider threat refers to any potential compromise, unauthorized use, 
or negligence performed by an NPS insider.  Because insiders have clearance to interact 
with the system for some valid reason and are not required to circumvent either the 
physical security and/or the identification and authentication mechanisms, the insider 
threat is the most difficult threat to defend against.  Also, because insider threats 
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encompass both intentional and non-intentional misuse of the network by insiders, it is 
the most common threat.  As of July 2004, there were 1581 students attending NPS and 
utilizing the campus network.  Of those 1581 students, two-hundred and eighty-six of 
them were military members of allied countries.  There is also another approximately 
two-hundred employees of NPS that are either support personnel or faculty.  In whole, 
there are nearly 2000 people possessing various technical and ethnic backgrounds that fit 
the description of an NPS insider. 
Insider threats can exist for various reasons and are not required to be malicious in 
nature.  In general, there are four main reasons why insider threats may be present for any 
given system.  They are as follows: 
• Ignorance 
• Carelessness 
• Disregard for policy 
• Maliciousness 
Ignorance becomes an issue when an insider either does not understand or know 
about the existing policies.  For example, a new employee may unknowingly break the 
information security policy by setting the password for a system account to an 
unacceptable length.  Carelessness occurs when an insider is aware of the security policy, 
but does not consider how certain actions would bypass the intent of the policy.  
Disregard for policy refers to the situation when an insider is fully aware of the policy 
and cognizant of the ramifications of certain actions that bypass the policy, but continues 
to perform those actions in an effort to increase ease of use and productivity.  For 
example, an insider may write a password on a piece of paper and be fully aware that the 
action is a violation of policy, but nevertheless continue to do so to make the task of 
logging on easier.  The previous three reasons carried no inherent bad intentions and 
would be performed from either a lack of knowledge or to make a task less cumbersome.  
Maliciousness occurs when an insider purposely sets out to break the information security 




Insider threats exist at NPS for each of the previously mentioned four reasons.  
The information security policy is not presented as mandatory reading material for all 
new incoming students or faculty.  For this reason, it is easy to see how ignorance could 
be a potential problem for the campus network users.  Also, the students, faculty, and 
support personnel at NPS have varying amounts of information technology expertise and 
at the present time, there are no mandatory courses or training seminars required to 
increase the awareness and ability of the network users.  For the insiders that have had 
the opportunity to read the policy and the technical ability to understand it, the threats for 
both carelessness and disregard for policy still exist.  As in any setting, the only way to 
educate insiders about the potential dangers of actions that bypass the intent of the 
information security policy is through training.  There is currently no mandatory 
information security training present at NPS.  Even if there were such training courses, 
there is no way to guarantee the network users would then decide to adhere completely to 
the policy. 
The threat of a malicious insider attack on the NPS campus network is elevated 
because of the high number of international students that attend NPS.  While all of the 
international students are military members of allied forces, it is still extremely difficult 
to screen a potential system user and uncover a hidden agenda when much of the 
student’s history has taken place in another country.  For the most part, all the members 
of the United States military that are attending NPS have dedicated many years of their 
career to the country and would not jeopardize their country or career by intentionally 
damaging the campus network or breaking the information security policy.  This being 
said, there is always the chance that an American military member could become 
disgruntled and seek revenge by damaging the campus network.  Also, there exist the 
potential for an NPS insider to be recruited by a rogue colleague or foreign intelligence 
source and either damage the network or provide access to data or computational 
capabilities.  The same possibilities for discontent holds true for the faculty and support 
personnel at NPS.  The following is a list of specific potential insider threats that exist for 




• Installation of Malware 
• Trojan Horse programs 
• Worms 
• Back doors 
• Rootkits 
• Denial of Service 
• Theft or disclosure of data 
• Packet Sniffing 
• Unauthorized use of software 
• Use of system resources for illegal acts 
• Use of system resources for personal profit 
• Abuse of access controls 
• Abuse of power 
• Physical theft or destruction of resources 
• Unauthorized use of hardware 
• Fraud 
C.   OUTSIDER THREAT 
The term outsider refers to any person that is not authorized to access the NPS 
campus network either physically or logically.  The term includes any person that is not 
formally approved to pass through the physical security or to remotely log on to the 
network from an outside system.  Any person that is granted access through the physical 
security, whether or not it is possible for them to log on to the network once inside is 
irrelevant, is considered an insider.  Again, because NPS is a government funded 
university and a graduate school closely affiliated with the Department of Defense and 
the Department of the Navy, there is no shortage of candidates available to attempt an 








• Organized crime 
• Terrorists 
• Spies 
• Political Activists 
• Former employees 
• Media 
There are many ways for an outsider to bypass security mechanisms put in place 
successfully to protect the network.  Also, many of these techniques are completely legal 
when performed in isolation.  For example, an outside attacker could easily obtain 
valuable information about the network through web research, network scanning, and 
DNS table examination.  Once this data has been assimilated, the attacker can create a 
profile of the network and begin to locate points of weakness.  After the weaknesses have 
been located, there are hundreds of potential actions the outsider attacker could perform 
to steal information, decrease network performance, or bring down the network 
altogether.  The following is a list of potential broad attack or action an outsider threat 
could attempt: 
• Installation of Malware 
• Trojan Horses 
• Worms 
• Back doors 
• Rootkits 
• Denial of service 
• Theft or disclosure of data 
• Packet sniffing 
• Buffer overflow 
• Escalation of privileges 
D.   ENVIRONMENTAL EVENTS 
The Naval Postgraduate School is located in Monterey California and is 
positioned between two of the most active fault lines in the world.  Recently, a scientific 
group known as WG99, which is composed of a large number of experts in the area of 
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earthquakes, made a less than promising diagnosis concerning the long-term stability of 
the San Francisco Bay area.  NPS sits directly between the San Andreas and San 
Gregorio fault lines and would adversely feel the effects of a strong earthquake in the 
region.  The study performed by WG99 predicts that the Monterey Bay area has a twenty-
five percent chance to be victimized by at least one 6.7 magnitude earthquake in the next 
twenty-five years (See Figure 21). 
Recently, there have been several earthquakes around the world of this size that 
may help predict the amount of damage that will occur in the event of a major earthquake 
in the Monterey Bay area.  A 6.7 magnitude earthquake struck Los Angeles, California, 
in 1994 and killed fifty-seven people, injured nine-thousand more, destroyed many 
buildings, and damaged much of the underlying infrastructure in the city.  In 1995, an 
earthquake of similar size killed six-thousand people and completely destroyed a city in 
Kobe Japan.  In short, an earthquake of this magnitude in the Monterey Bay area could 
destroy buildings and infrastructure, and kill people that are crucial for the NPS campus 
network to operate and maintain information. 
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Figure 21.   San Francisco Bay Region Earthquake Probability. [From: Ref. 2] 
 
Another cause for concern in the Monterey Bay region is flooding.  The most 
likely cause of flooding comes from surface runoff during times of heavy seasonal rain.  
Because over ninety percent of rainfall in the Monterey Bay area occurs between 
November and April, flooding is usually only a seasonal hazard.  However, there are two 
major dams located in the area and if they failed in the event of a large earthquake, there 
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could be catastrophic flooding.  Because NPS is located so close to the Pacific Ocean, 
earthquakes are also responsible for other types of flooding.  While they are much more 
likely to occur on islands such as Hawaii, a tsunami could possibly bury NPS with 
enormous waves of ocean water or cause ocean swells that would flood the surrounding 
area.  All of these flooding situations could temporarily shut down the NPS campus 
network, or worse yet, destroy hardware that is vital to the ability of the network to 
maintain data. 
E.   SUPPORT BREAKDOWN 
The state of California has a population of over thirty-three million and represents 
approximately twelve percent of the entire population of the United States.  Because of 
the massive number of people living in California and the extremely hot climate in some 
portions of the state, there is often a drain on the energy supply.  This situation has 
caused the need for sporadic rolling blackouts during the hot summer months when air 
conditioners across the state are running at a steady rate.  The California Independent 
System operator, who is in charge of the power supply in the state of California, issues a 
notice for an energy load reduction to the Californian utility companies.  The utility 
companies are then forced to reply by temporarily shutting the power down in blocks 
located in their areas for various amounts of time until the state power supply reaches an 
acceptable level.   
The energy crisis and high probability of a blackout situation in California could 
cause the NPS campus network severe problems during years that are exceptionally hot.  
A blackout lasting longer than the time the network can run on auxiliary power could be 
disastrous to the campus network.  Also, the high probability of an earthquake also 
significantly increases the likelihood of a substantial blackout.  Because of these 
situations where blackouts seem inevitable, it is imperative that NPS implement an 
impeccable policy to deal with the loss of power. 
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IV.  VULNERABILITY IDENTIFICATION 
A.   OVERVIEW 
A vulnerability is a flaw or weakness in an information system, system security 
procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited, either 
accidentally or intentionally, and result in a security breach or violation of the system’s 
security policy.  Identifying vulnerabilities in a system as large as the NPS network is a 
daunting task, but a thorough investigation of the vulnerabilities present must be done in 
order to assure the aggregate risk of the network is being determined during the risk 
assessment process.   
Identification of vulnerabilities can be done at any point in a system’s lifecycle, 
and depending on where a system is in its lifecycle, the types of vulnerabilities and the 
methods used to determine their presence are different.  Since the NPS network, during 
the writing of this document, is in a state of flux while being split into the .mil and .edu 
domains, it is difficult to determine its exact life cycle stage.  As best it can be 
determined, it falls between the Installation and Operation and Maintenance stages of the 
System Life Cycle overview as described in the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
Information Assurance Publication 5239-16.  Basically, this means that identification of 
vulnerabilities can be done by use of any of the following: 
• System design documentation 
• Certification Test and Evaluation results 
• Site Test and Evaluation Results 
• System security features 
• Technical and procedural security controls 
• System usage and audit reports 
• Previous risk assessment documentation 
Since no previous risk assessment documentation of the NPS network exists 
during the writing of this document, the NPS network has not yet been certified, and 
because access to much of the documentation of the NPS network has not been granted 
for this project, the majority of the vulnerability identification was done by interviewing 
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NPS personnel associated with the configuration and management of the network as well 
as comparing external vulnerability documentation of vendors with what the system 
characterization investigation revealed.  
Since the .mil and .edu domains of the NPS network are essentially part of the 
same physical network, all vulnerabilities associated with either domain are present in 
both, because a network is only as secure as its weakest link.  This is stated very clearly 
in the UTNProtect policy that has been laid out by the Navy and Marine Corps, and could 
be a potential problem when the .mil domain of the network needs to be certified for 
addition to the NMCI in the near future, but the consequences of this potential problem 
are beyond the scope of this paper. 
B.   GENERAL VULNERABILITIES 
A preliminary investigation of the security posture of the NPS site revealed 
several site-specific vulnerabilities, which have been singled out and discussed below.   
1.   IA Staff 
The most glaring vulnerability of the NPS network is a lack of staff devoted to the 
security of the network.  As a result of not having sufficient staff, information assurance 
seems to be more of an afterthought than a daily consideration for the NPS network.  
With so few man-hours devoted to providing security to the network, the IA staff is only 
able to take care of the more pressing issues of the day, such as the latest virus threat, but 
isn’t truly able to keep ahead of the overall security posture of the network.  As an 
example, security auditing is taking place on the NPS network, as necessary in any large 
network and a good practice to have in place, but the audit logs are not being given the 
review time needed to make them a useful part of the security plan.   
Other issues like patch management are definitely a priority for the NPS network, 
but with so few on hand to propagate patches campus-wide, it is next to impossible for 
the staff to keep entirely up-to-date with the threats.  With so many patches needed for 
newly discovered exploitable flaws, the time frame involved falls beyond an acceptable 





2.   Training 
Without continuous training on vulnerabilities and how to minimize them, another 
vulnerability, in essence, is being created.  Most staff and users on the network have no 
security-specific training, which could be a potentially huge problem when it comes to 
user error and its consequences on security.  This factor combined with the somewhat 
open atmosphere associated with any educational institution could be disastrous in the 
right circumstances.  This is especially true considering that a percentage of the student 
population is being introduced to malicious exploits through coursework and could be 
responsible for accidental damage to the network.  All Department of Defense facilities 
are supposed to have a training program in place to minimize the risk associated with 
user error, and since NPS falls under this category it should be no exception. 
Another training issue that needs to be considered at NPS is the vulnerability that 
is created when staff members are relied upon to do their own software updates.  Many 
staff members do not know how to do this properly and others think it is not important 
and do not worry about doing it at all.  If staff members are being relied upon to update 
their own software, then they must have training to let them know the proper way to do 
updates.  Training would also need to stress the importance of keeping software updated 
on a regular basis in order to minimize the vulnerabilities that exist on the system.    
3.   Configuration Management/Configuration Control Board 
Although certain areas of campus are configured and updated regularly, there is 
no consistency to the process.  Also, without proper training of staff as described above, 
many different versions of software are running on campus computers because they have 
not been properly updated.  Adding to the problem is the fact that no centralized 
configuration management system or configuration control board exists on campus to 
make sure all systems at NPS are managed uniformly.  These vulnerabilities can lead to 
serious security holes in the campus network.   
The Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) process was designed by 
the Department of Defense to alleviate some problems sites were having with keeping 
configurations and patches current.  By issuing IAVA alerts that must be acknowledged 
and complied with, they had hoped a certain level of security could be maintained among 
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all DoD systems.  NPS is one such site that must comply with IAVA alerts, but 
complying with the alerts simply means letting DISA know which systems have been 
updated via a web page that has been designed for this purpose.  There is no penetration 
testing done by DISA to make sure sites are fully compliant, so even if a site is not 
keeping all systems updated according to the IAVA process, there is no way for DISA to 
know.  NPS keeps as current as can be with the IAVA alerts, but when even they are not 
sure exactly what configurations they are dealing with at their own site, the IAVA 
process will not be much help in and of itself. 
Being that NPS is an educational institution, strict enforcement of configurations 
is not always possible because of the academic nature of much of the work.  Because of 
this, individuals are being allowed to administrate systems connected to the network 
without much knowledge of how to keep them secure, and are able to install software on 
machines without knowledge of IT staff.  Although a certain amount of flexibility needs 
to be maintained at an educational institution to promote research and learning, this 
causes not only problems for that particular machine, but it may also open up security 
holes in the entire network.   
Not having a centralized body responsible for decision-making also results in the 
situation of having a large amount of “rogue” servers on campus.  These servers have 
been connected to the network for some reason or another that has probably been 
forgotten.  As a result, no one among the IT staff is completely sure if these servers are 
still in use or what their purpose is, nor (in a lot of cases) even where they are located on 
campus.  Not knowing much about what exists on the network and not knowing where 
machines are physically located so they can be disconnected from the network is an 
extremely vulnerable situation to be in, because if the security of these “rogue” servers is 
not being kept up, they are essentially an open door for attackers to enter the network.  
4.  Physical Security 
NPS is a gated campus with guards posted at all entrances around the clock.  This 
is a decent deterrent for outsiders who would like to enter campus for malicious reasons, 
although it is not entirely impossible to get access to the campus without credentials.  
People have successfully gained entrance to campus several times in the past, whether by 
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sheer accident or by talking their way past the guards, and although these incidents have 
been benign, someone with less morality could gain admittance onto campus in the same 
manner if they were so inclined. 
Unfortunately, the gated atmosphere of NPS also presents a false sense of security 
when it comes to securing the internal buildings of the campus.  This leads to a less 
strenuous approach to physical security from those on campus responsible for the 
physical security of network devices and equipment associated with those devices.  As a 
result of this false sense of security, many of the network devices that reside inside the 
gates of NPS have very lax physical security and could be easily accessed by anyone who 
really wanted to gain admittance to them.   
This rather lax approach to physical security presents a very large vulnerability to 
the most common threat for all networks:  the insider.  Insiders are those people who are 
allowed access onto campus and have credentials that allow them that access.  They are 
granted a certain level of trust, and with that trust comes a major vulnerability for the 
network if they have gained that it falsely.  Because of the breakdown in physical security 
above and beyond the campus perimeter, a determined insider would have absolutely no 
trouble at all gaining access to physical devices connected to the network and installing 
malicious software or a network monitoring device.  With a large portion of the student 
population being from foreign countries, and considering the constant variability of 
foreign policy, this could be a potentially serious vulnerability depending on the political 
climate of the time. 
5.   Proxy Server 
NPS does not have a proxy server, making the site even more vulnerable to 
malicious software that can be downloaded from the Internet.  A proxy server basically 
acts as a middleman between client machines and the outside world.  If malicious 
software is being downloaded from a web page to a client machine, the proxy server can 
perform scans on the malicious software and may be able to detect it and destroy it before 
it infiltrates the network.  If the proxy server is not able to destroy the malicious software 
before being infected itself, it is still able to contain any damage done before the internal  
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network is exposed.  Sometimes, this causes the proxy server to be become a sacrificial 
lamb of sorts for the network, but having to take down one server for repairs is preferable 
to having to cleanse an entire network of a virus infestation.   
Without a proxy server present at NPS, client machines are able to download 
potentially malicious software directly from the Internet without a middleman to 
intervene.  This could end up in an infection of the internal network without any 
possibility of containment.  Combined with the lack of training of users of the network 
and lack of staff to clean up any infection on the network quickly, this could cause 
serious damage to data stored on the network and increased downtime for the entire 
network if infection were to occur., because it would result in a massive denial of service 
for the entire campus. 
6.   Backups 
Many environmental threats that could possibly affect the NPS campus would 
have potentially devastating results in regards to the data stored on-site.  The only way to 
recover from a catastrophic event like this is to have a contingency plan that includes 
backing up data and have a plan for restoring backups in the event the original data is 
lost.  NPS does have a plan in place for backing up data, but one problem that could 
result in total data loss in the event that a catastrophic event occurred is not storing the 
backups properly. 
NPS does weekly incremental backups of the most important data and full 
backups once a month, which is sufficient for recovery purposes if a small-scale disaster 
were to take and the backups were not affected by the disaster.  The problem is that these 
backups are stored on-site and not stored in specially designed disaster-proof backup data 
storage units.  This is not only a potential vulnerability if the entire site is ever affected by 
a catastrophic event, but also if the area where the backups are stored is affected by the 
event which results in the backups being destroyed.  Any event that destroyed the on-site 
backups would result in loss of all the data with no possibility of recovery.  
7.   External Connections 
An external connection to the Defense Management Data Center (DMDC) exists 
and is joined to the NPS campus network through a dedicated T-1 line that passes 
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through the external router of the .mil domain.  The DMDC is configured as a subnet on 
the NPS domain in order to have access to the mainframe for personnel data stored there.  
This is a backdoor to the network and presents a major vulnerability that could be 
exploited by just about anyone.  The communication sent between the two sites is sent in 
the clear, so anyone with access to this T-1 line anywhere along its physical route would 
be able to tap in and steal or corrupt data being sent between the two.  This also presents 
a major problem of an external source having trusted internal access to the NPS network 
if access can be gained through this backdoor. 
C.   SPECIFIC VULNERABILITIES 
Although the previous vulnerabilities can definitely affect the security posture of 
a network, and should be treated seriously, the majority of exploits in a network are the 
result of hardware and software vulnerabilities.  These vulnerabilities mainly exist 
because of the nature of the development process of most of the products used in any 
network environment, and are so easily exploited because they are shared with the hacker 
communities across the Internet.  Since new vulnerabilities are being found daily and new 
patches are required to keep a system’s security posture up-to-date, these vulnerabilities 
are often the toughest to guard against.  This is further compounded by the fact that NPS 
does not have enough staff to realistically keep every system on campus patched 
completely, as was mentioned in the site-specific vulnerabilities above. 
Since there are a lot of unknowns about the NPS network, it is nearly impossible 
to get a grasp, as a whole, on exactly which vulnerabilities are being guarded against and 
which are not, but a network is only as strong as its weakest link and any vulnerability at 
any point in the network causes a vulnerability for the entire network.  By researching all 
hardware and software vulnerabilities associated with the configurations running on the 
NPS network, both .mil and .edu domains, a comprehensive list of possible 
vulnerabilities were identified and appear in the table of possible vulnerabilities in 
Appendix C.  The table also contains the estimated likelihood of exploitation of the 
vulnerability, the magnitude of impact if exploitation were to occur, and an assigned level 
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V.   COUNTERMEASURE RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   OVERVIEW 
In the previous chapter, the vulnerabilities were identified and the risk associated 
with those vulnerabilities was determined.  This chapter attempts to eliminate, or at the 
very least mitigate, as much of the identified risk as possible by suggesting 
countermeasures that can be applied.  By eliminating or mitigating the risk associated 
with the network’s vulnerabilities, the residual risk of the system and its data should be 
able to be brought within an acceptable level during the certification and accreditation 
process.  Keeping in mind that no organization has limitless resources for placing 
countermeasures on their network, the suggested countermeasures are as cost-effective 
and practical for the NPS environment as possible.  Each suggested countermeasure is 
discussed in detail below. 
B.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.   Auditing 
Auditing is easily one of the least utilized countermeasures in all of network 
security at NPS, but it is also one of the most important if administrators are to be 
proactive in the hardening of their network.  Minimal auditing is taking place at NPS, and 
that is an important start, but the audit logs are not being reviewed on a regular basis and 
this can be potentially dangerous.  Sometimes audit logs are the only thing that can be 
relied upon when all other lines of defense are showing that nothing is wrong in a 
network. 
Auditing events that may point to potential attacks on a network may give 
network administrators a chance to catch an attacker before an attack actually happens.  
The only way this could be a success, though, is if someone is analyzing the audit logs 
for those scenarios on a regular basis.  If attack scenarios are spotted early on, steps can 
be taken to make sure no further damage is done.  This is why audit logs are such an 
important part of any network security plan. 
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Audit logs are also one of the few ways administrators will be able to deter or 
catch any malicious insiders that may be abusing their privileges.  Knowing that their 
actions are being audited is a major deterrent for most users of a system, but for the small 
percentage that is not deterred by this knowledge, auditing and reviewing audit logs is a 
sure way to catch them red-handed.  To ensure that the malicious insiders are not able to 
tamper with the audit logs as well to cover their tracks, a separation of duties system 
should be put into place.   
Most networks have multiple administrators all with the same privileges, which 
allows anyone who maliciously gains access to one of those accounts full administrator 
privileges and free reign to do whatever damage they want to the network.  If each 
administrator account were restricted to only the access needed for the person to do their 
assigned duties, (i.e. one person handles audit logs, one person handles opening new 
accounts, etc.) multiple people would need to collaborate in order to both commit 
malicious activities and cover it up by editing or deleting the audit logs.  Since everyone 
goes through a background check at NPS, the odds of one malicious insider getting 
another insider to help with malicious activities are very slim and will probably result in 
someone in authority being told.  This separation of duties in regards to audit logs is vital 
if malicious insiders are to be caught. 
Another step in the importance of auditing is the analysis of audit logs. Analyzing 
audit logs is no easy task, though, and requires a great amount of training for any 
individual chosen to perform this particular duty.  Volumes of knowledge must be 
learned about how attackers carry out their malicious tasks, in order to be able to spot the 
telltale signs of an attack as it is taking place.  If the person analyzing the logs does not 
know what to look for, the audit logs are not serving their intended purpose, and the 
security of the network suffers. 
Audit logs are also important in the event that it is known an attack has occurred 
and administrators of the network are not sure how or when it was committed.  This is 
where audit logs come in.  Audit logs can be an important asset in any forensic 
investigation of a break-in, because they answer the how and when of attacks that have 
taken place and allow for patching of security holes that may have been overlooked.  
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Because of the importance of the audit logs and their use in retracing the steps of 
attackers, they cannot be stored where an attacker would be able to destroy or edit them.  
They can be stored in a remote location or in several locations at once to ensure 
redundancy, but in either case, they should be reviewed regularly and backed up in case a 
question about a possible attack arises later.  Backups of the audit logs should be secured 
from anyone other than those who have access to the original audit logs, otherwise there 
is a chance that the audit logs could fall into the wrong hands. 
2.   Increased Security Personnel 
Many of the problems with the security of the network at NPS stem from the fact 
that there is not enough personnel dedicated to the protection of the network.  All other 
countermeasure recommendations are based on this one, because more cannot be done 
without an increase in the security personnel available.  Without having sufficient 
personnel to carry out tasks vital to the security of the network, they simply do not get 
done properly or sometimes at all.  The current security personnel do the best they can 
with the resources they have available to them, but this is not enough to secure the NPS 
network.   
More personnel are needed when it comes to things such as rolling out critical 
updates campus-wide when new malicious software has been detected and a new patch 
has been released.  Usually by the time a patch has been released, malicious software is 
already spreading across the Internet, so timing is essential.  Installing patches as quickly 
as possible to all campus machines is a necessary step in the protection of the network 
because it seals a previously unknown hole in the network’s defenses before it can be 
exploited by attackers.  The sooner steps like these are taken, the better off the security 
posture of the network is, and without enough personnel to carry out patching, the longer 
the security hole remains open.   
Increases in personnel would also be vital if audit logs are going to be a useful 
part of the defense of the network.  Although auditing is being carried out at NPS, much 
auditing that could be done is not being done because there just is not anyone to review 
the logs on a regular basis.  When logs are being kept but not being reviewed, they really 
do not serve much purpose for the security of the network, except as an afterthought to 
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confirm that there was an attack and how it was carried out.  Increasing personnel would 
enable audit logs to be reviewed daily and could result in detection and prevention of 
malicious activity before it could cause any major damage. 
3.   Training 
Training personnel who manage or use a network is critical in the protection of 
systems connected to the network.  If users are not properly trained on what they should 
or should not be doing on a network, user error creates a major vulnerability to the 
network.  Personnel managing the network should be trained in general information 
assurance practices as well as trained to use specific software/hardware associated with 
the NPS network.  This includes, but is not limited to, routers, intrusion detection 
systems, firewalls, servers, network scanning tools, operating systems used at the site, 
and any software running on those operating systems.  While no one person can be an 
expert in every single area of a large network like NPS, the combined knowledge of the 
network management team should be as complete as possible as it pertains to the 
network. 
Much of the general information assurance knowledge can be learned from 
coursework here at the university or from graduate students here who have taken those 
courses and are looking for a place to put that knowledge to work.  A university that 
prides itself on having one of the best computer science security curricula in the country 
should have a network that reflects that distinction, and the resources to make it a reality 
are definitely available.  A program that creates a relationship between the security track 
curriculum and the network security personnel at NPS might be a beneficial venture all 
around. 
As far as the specific training needed for hardware and software being used on 
campus, outside sources will most likely be needed.  Given that NPS is situated near what 
many consider to be the technology epicenter of the world, Silicon Valley, outside 
sources should not be tough to acquire.  Many of the manufacturers of the hardware and 
software that NPS uses are located in the Silicon Valley area and give seminars about 
their products on a regular basis.  Some of these manufacturers have even come to NPS 
to give talks recently and would probably be more than happy to do so again.  If the 
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administrators of the network at NPS could take advantage of these resources, much 
could be learned about the vulnerabilities of the products used on the network and how 
those vulnerabilities could be mitigated. 
With a network management team that is well-versed in keeping the network 
secure, passing this knowledge on to the users of the systems at NPS would be a very 
simple process.  All incoming staff and students could be given network security training 
as a predecessor to being given an account with which to log on to the campus network.  
This training would be rather basic, but comprehensive enough to minimize user error 
and keep systems from being victims of ignorance.  Subjects such as choosing good 
passwords, opening email attachments, and activating modems for unauthorized dial-in 
usage could be covered, as well as any other topics deemed necessary.  Of course, this 
would not completely eradicate the problems, but at least misunderstanding of the 
consequences of these actions would be diminished and the NPS community as a whole 
would be more aware of their role in the security of the network. 
4.   Configuration Management 
Good configuration management is a key ingredient in any large system if that 
system is to be secure.  Having good configuration management would give the 
administrators of the NPS network a better idea of what exists on their systems and where 
those systems are located.  Having a centralized entity that is responsible for making sure 
all systems on campus are enforcing the security policies would increase the security of 
the network immensely.  This centralization process could be accomplished by creating a 
configuration control board to make configuration decisions or by investing in 
configuration control software to carry out configuration tasks, although the best solution 
would be a combination of these two approaches. 
A configuration control board would be a great idea for NPS so that decisions on 
how the network should be configured could be discussed among key personnel and 
decided on accordingly.  Having a committee to make these decisions would allow for 
more control over what was to be used and where it was to reside and would make sure 
that no individual was making these decisions without knowledge of those in charge.  
General campus configurations of hardware such as routers, firewalls, and servers would 
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be more secure if they were decided upon by a group of people educated in the language 
of these devices, rather than decided on by individuals who may not be qualified.  Also, 
by investigating what software and services are truly needed by the campus community 
and basing configuration decisions on the results, excess security holes could be lessened 
as much as possible and the principle of least privilege could be maintained. 
As an addition to the decision-making process of the configuration control board, 
configuration management software could be used to enforce the policies set forth by 
those decisions.  There are many configuration management software solutions available, 
and by investing in one of these, NPS network administrators could make sure all 
machines on campus are running a pre-defined set of configurations based upon the 
policies created by the configuration control board.  Configuration management software 
would provide a level of consistency that is lacking on the NPS network by making sure 
security settings on all devices are the same and enforce security policy.  It would also 
ensure a higher level of proactive enforcement of security policies and allow NPS 
personnel to maintain more control.  
5.   Physical Security 
Although physical security is already in place at NPS in the form of the perimeter 
gate guards, this doesn’t necessarily mean that physical security is not a countermeasure 
that needs to be further refined.  Physical security of all devices connected to the 
network, especially the backbone of the network, needs to be a priority.  If someone has 
physical access to a device, the device can be completely controlled by them, which 
would mean they would be able to bypass any other security mechanisms that may be in 
place.  This situation must be taken seriously and prevented at all costs or else the rest of 
the security that has been put in place on the network is all for naught. 
Many exterior doors at NPS are left unlocked in the evenings after everyone has 
left for the day, which allows indoor access to buildings containing network devices.  
Also, many network devices are kept in rooms with cipher locks to which more people 
than necessary know the combination.  Since need-to-know policies are not being strictly 
enforced, some of these people who have the combinations do not need them, and should 
therefore not know them.  Even if the combination is not known, though, it has been 
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proven that the 5-key cipher locks used on campus are not incredibly difficult to crack by 
brute force in a relatively short period of time.  Given access to these doors when no one 
else is around (i.e., in the evenings), anyone would be able to gain entrance to a locked 
room containing network devices.  An attacker would then be able to do any one of a 
number of malicious things, all of which would result in decreased security posture of the 
network and possible loss of data confidentiality or integrity. 
To protect physical access better to rooms containing network devices, doors 
should be protected with 10-digit keypads with authorization codes of at least eight digits, 
and possibly magnetic card strip readers in locations containing backbone devices for the 
network.  Access to these rooms should be granted only to personnel who need to have 
access on a daily basis and the authorization codes should not be given to anyone else 
unless they undergo an authorization process controlled by management.  Closed-circuit 
hidden cameras should be used to monitor the entrances to these secure rooms, or at the 
very least installation of fake cameras that are highly visible can be used to deter break-
ins. 
6.   Proxy Server 
Installation of a proxy server is another line of defense that could be used to 
secure the NPS network.  A proxy server acts as a middleman between the Internet and 
client machines on the NPS network by sending client requests and receiving replies from 
web servers.  Requests for web resources always pass through the proxy server and 
responses to those requests can be checked for malicious software before being sent 
along to the client that requested the resource.   
Currently, NPS relies completely on the antivirus software it has installed on 
client machines across campus to stop malicious software infections.  Although antivirus 
software is a necessary part of any defense-in-depth approach to network security, relying 
solely on antivirus software is not enough.  When malicious software is downloaded to a 
client with antivirus software, it becomes a race between the antivirus software detecting 
and the malicious software infecting.  This is a battle that the malicious software will, 
more than likely, win, especially if the antivirus signatures are not regularly updated.   
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Taking the chance that antivirus software won’t be able to quarantine malicious software 
before it infects the network is not a chance any secure network’s administrator should 
take.   
By installing a proxy server, NPS would have a first line of defense against 
malicious software being downloaded from the Internet, and could potentially stop and 
quarantine any malicious software that was detected.  A proxy server also caches many 
web resources that are used most often by NPS personnel, so that fewer downloads are 
necessary and contact with the virus-infested Internet is minimized.   
7.   Patch Management 
Patch management is probably one of the most important jobs of any network 
security personnel, because of the inherent flaws in the software development process 
that are carried down into the commercial products used in all networks, including the 
NPS network.  New flaws are constantly being discovered in systems that are in place in 
a network, which means new patches are constantly being developed to combat those 
flaws.  If these patches are not installed on systems that contain the flaws in a relatively 
short time frame, attackers are free to exploit those flaws and gain access to unprotected 
networks.  
Since there is a lack of sufficient personnel to carry out adequate patch 
management at NPS, as discussed above, patches needed to close holes in the security of 
the network often do not get the attention they deserve.  By scanning the network for 
well-known exploits, which is actually done on a regular basis, it is easy to see that NPS 
is not completely up-to-date on its patch management.  The same vulnerabilities are 
sometimes discovered week after week because they have not yet been patched.  
Although getting rid of all vulnerabilities in a network is an impossible task, installing 
readily available patches to fix well-known security holes in a network must be done and 
is one of the first things any network administrator should do to begin securing their 
network.  A vast majority of the vulnerabilities listed in the previous chapter are exploits 
that could be easily prevented by installing an available patch.  A good patch 
management plan would go a long way to fixing this particular issue.   
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A patch management plan goes hand in hand with a configuration management 
plan, and should be implemented at the same time for simplicity.  If the configurations on 
network computers are standard, testing patches on several representative machines 
becomes possible and rolling out the patches across all machines becomes a much 
simpler and faster process.  By refining the entire process of patching, administrators can 
achieve a more proactive approach to defending the network instead of always trying to 
clean up a disaster that has already occurred.  Many patch management software 
solutions are also available that could be used to make sure all machines are up-to-date 
with their patching needs as easily as possible. 
8.   Backups 
NPS does weekly incremental backups and a full backup every month in order to 
protect themselves from data loss in the event of a catastrophic event, but those backups 
are stored on-site and not well protected.  These backups should be stored in disaster-
proof backup data storage units at the very least to protect from any minor incidents on 
campus.  These storage units protect backup tapes from melting in the event of a fire or 
from destruction by water in the event the sprinkler systems are activated or a flood 
occurs.  This will ensure recovery of data if a minor disaster occurs and affects some, but 
not all, of the campus environment 
Ideally, though, NPS needs to store their backup tapes redundantly at an offsite 
facility in case of a disaster that affects the entire site.  If a disaster destroys the backups 
that are stored on site as well as the original data, NPS would have no way of recovering 
and restoring data and everything would be lost.  If backups, however, are stored in an 
off-site facility that is in another location, the chances of the disaster striking both places 
simultaneously are very minimal, so full recovery and restoring of data would still be 
quite possible in an emergency situation. 
9.   External Connections 
Any external connection to a network should be considered a potential point of 
attack no matter how insignificant it may appear.  The external connection that comes 
into the NPS network from DMDC at Fort Ord should have more security associated with  
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it if it is to be considered safe from attack.  Even though the Fort Ord facility is trusted, 
and physical access to that facility is not a realistic attack strategy, attackers are still able 
to gain physical access to the T-1 line itself if they know this connection exists.   
At the very least, the data being sent back and forth between the two sites should 
use strong encryption in the event that a man-in-the-middle attack takes place.  This 
would prevent any data that was gained from being read in the clear and prevent attackers 
from using replay attacks.  NPS should also practice the principal of least privilege by 
only allowing admittance to areas of the network that need to be accessed from this 
connection instead of allowing access to the mainframe.  If a malicious attacker was able 
to gain entry to NPS from this backdoor, they should not be able to have free reign.  If 
everyone connecting to NPS through this connection is subject to security procedures that 
verify their identity and limit their activity, severity of an attack from this connection 
could be lessened measurably. 
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
Certification and accreditation is a set of rigorous procedures defined in 
Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5200.40, and a requirement of any system that 
is being operated or developed by the Department of Defense.  Since the Department of 
the Navy oversees the Naval Postgraduate School, it falls under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Defense, and as a result, must follow the guidelines set forth by the DoD.  
As a result of these guidelines, the Naval Postgraduate School’s gigabit network must 
undergo the certification and accreditation process.  A current effort is underway at the 
time of writing, to conduct certification and accreditation procedures on the NPS gigabit 
network.  The purpose of this paper is to assist in the certification process of the NPS 
network by conducting a thorough risk assessment of the network and reporting the 
results, which can in turn be used to help make the decision whether or not the network 
should be certified and accredited. 
At the beginning of the investigation of the NPS network, there were a lot of 
questions to ask, some of which turned out to be easy and others of which turned out to 
be more difficult, but all of which needed to be answered if a thorough risk assessment 
was to be conducted.  Many of the initial questions involved the physical layout of the 
network, which was able to be determined in the first stage of the risk assessment 
process:  system characterization.  System characterization is conducted as a first step to 
the risk assessment process in order to determine the scale of the network and where the 
accreditation boundary lies, the hardware and software involved, and the external 
connections of the network.  This stage of the risk assessment process consisted mostly of 
viewing existing diagrams of the network, scanning the network to corroborate what was 
shown in the diagrams, and physically inspecting the network devices and their 
connections.  In the end, a comprehensive view of the layout of the network and its 
connections was established.  Once the questions about the physical layout of the network 
were answered and the picture was completely understood, the next stage of the risk 
assessment process could begin. 
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The second stage of the risk assessment process, threat identification, involved 
taking stock of the environment surrounding the NPS gigabit network and determining 
what threats could be found in that environment.  Many threats are somewhat generic 
which makes them the same for all networks, and the NPS network is no exception.  
Insiders, outsiders, and environmental threats can relate to any system, but how these 
threats relate to the NPS campus specifically needed to be determined during phase two.  
Determining the depth of the insider and outsider threats was a somewhat difficult 
concept, but environmental threats were a little more concrete.  Investigation of these 
threats not only gave an understanding of how the network might be penetrated, but it 
also allowed a greater understanding of what sorts of countermeasures would later need 
to be put into place to combat these threats.  After threats were identified, identification 
of the vulnerabilities was the next step taken in the risk assessment procedure. 
Stage three of the risk assessment further allowed for development of 
countermeasures by investigating what vulnerabilities exist in the NPS environment.  
This step, along with the previous one, are the key elements in determining what risks are 
affecting the system.  Vulnerability identification involved going back to the system 
characterization to investigate what possible vulnerabilities could exist given the 
configuration of the network and then determining whether those vulnerabilities were 
present.  Investigating the security procedures for the network, such as patching, auditing, 
and configuration management, during this stage gave a complete picture of what 
vulnerabilities could be expected and made narrowing down the list of possible 
vulnerabilities an easier task.  Of course, after the investigation was finished, patching 
and changes in the network continued to take place, because the NPS network is a system 
in use on a daily basis.  This may have resulted in the list of vulnerabilities changing, but 
these are things that need to be dealt with when performing a risk assessment on a 
changing network.   
Determining every conceivable vulnerability is most likely not a possibility for 
any network this size, but by collecting as much information as possible during this stage 
of the risk assessment process, the network is much more secure when the 
countermeasures have been determined and applied.  Also, the more work that is put into 
finding vulnerabilities at this stage, the more informed the DAA can be in making the 
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decision whether or not to certify and accredit the system.  No system is completely 
without vulnerabilities, but the DAA cannot make an informed decision if he doesn’t 
have the most thorough information available. 
After characterizing the system, identifying the risk, and identifying the 
vulnerabilities of the network, risk analysis was able to be performed and 
countermeasures were then able to be suggested.  Analysis of the risk was done by 
assessing the likelihood of successful exploitation of a vulnerability, the magnitude of 
impact if a vulnerability were to be exploited, and then assigning each vulnerability a 
level of risk.  Overall, it was found that the risk associated with the vulnerabilities found 
was medium to high, which suggests that countermeasures needed to be put in place to 
lower the risk to an acceptable level if the network were to be successfully certified and 
accredited. 
Suggested countermeasures were decided upon according to how much they 
would impact the NPS gigabit network’s security posture without being afforded an 
unlimited budget.  Some countermeasures that were suggested were conducting better 
configuration management, patching more rigorously, and reviewing audit logs on a 
regular basis, among others.  These countermeasures are by no means out of reach of the 
current network administration, and should be implemented even without the certification 
and accreditation process taking place.  For the most part, the only suggested 
countermeasure that has budgetary concerns attached to it is the suggestion that more 
security personnel be hired to help implement all of the other countermeasures.  This may 
be the most important suggestion, though, because of the already existing lack of 
qualified personnel and the extra workload suggested by adoption of these 
countermeasures.  By adopting the countermeasures that have been suggested, a 
heightened level of network security can be realized, and should be an effective tool for 
getting the NPS network certified and accredited by the DAA.  Even so, by no means is it 
suggested that the level of risk will be lowered to nil. 
The risk assessment of any network that is already in use, such as the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s gigabit network during the writing of this document, is a changing 
and constantly evolving process.  As such, the architecture, configuration, and security 
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posture of the network is most likely not exactly the same at the conclusion of this 
investigation as it was when the investigation was begun, but every effort has been made 
to consider the future of the network and how it will affect the risk assessment process.  
To further complicate matters, the NPS network is currently undergoing some changes as 
it splits into the .mil and .edu domains, but the overall threats, vulnerabilities, and risks 
will remain constant, which makes the recommended countermeasures all the more 
important as these changes are being made. 
NPS is a somewhat unique network in the DoD in that it is connected with a 
university atmosphere on one side and a military atmosphere on the other.  The university 
community is notorious for having lax security and is much of the reason behind the 
security posture of the entire Internet to this day.  The military community on the other 
hand is constantly trying to improve the security posture of their networks to keep 
intruders out.  The NPS network falls in the unexplored gap between the two.  Security is 
a concern, but not as much of a concern as most military installations, because of the less 
critical nature of the information stored within.  Being that the overall criticality of the 
system at NPS is low, some of the risk associated with the vulnerabilities present is 
acceptable.  Overall, though, it was determined that there is improvement needed as it 
applies to the security posture of the network.  If the suggested countermeasures are put 
in place, there should be no problems with certifying or accrediting the system. 
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APPENDIX A.  SERVER LIST  
 
Name OS Dept Domain Description Admin 
CASTOR Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0 ACS NPGS Autocad server  





HAMPTON Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS Citrix 
Charles 
Taylor 
HOUSTON Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS Citrix 
Charles 
Taylor 
Ducktail Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS Citrix Servers 
Charles 
Taylor 
Flatop Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS Citrix Servers 
Charles 
Taylor 
Mohawk Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS Citrix Servers 
Charles 
Taylor 
Weave Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS Citrix Servers 
Charles 
Taylor 










































Name OS Dept Domain Description Admin 
FIBER Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS EHF 
Neil 
Harvey 
PDC-51TRAIN Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS EWS EWS Test 
Eldor 
Magat 







Microsoft Windows 2000 



































Raven Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS Fastdata Bob Sharp 
RAMAGE Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS 
Fastdata Test 
Server Bob Sharp 
Triton Windows 2000 Advanced Server  NPGS File server 
Eldor 
Magat 





Cyclone Microsoft Windows 2000 Server EWS NPGS File servers 
Eldor 
Magat 
Falcon Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS File servers 
Eldor 
Magat 
Kiska Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS File servers 
Eldor 
Magat 




Name OS Dept Domain Description Admin 
RUSHMORE Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0 EWS NPGS File servers 
Eldor 
Magat 
Yukon Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS File servers 
Eldor 
Magat 





LEXINGTON Microsoft Windows NT Advanced Server EWS NPGS Gone 
Eldor 
Magat 
AZTEC Windows 2000 Advanced Server  NPGS Landesk Server Bob Sharp 
INCA Windows 2000 Advanced Server  NPGS 
Landesk SQL 
2000 Alan Pires 
eagle Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS 
Landesk Test 
server Bob Sharp 
Max Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0 EWS NPGS Maximo Bob Sharp 




















STRINGRAY Unix EWS NPGS NAS File Servers 
Eldor 
Magat 
TORNADO Unix EWS  NAS File Servers 
Eldor 
Magat 
Copperhead Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS Norton Antivirus 
Charles 
Taylor 
Krait Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS Norton Antivirus 
Charles 
Taylor 
Mamba Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS Norton Antivirus 
Charles 
Taylor 
MAYAN Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS Not assigned yet 
Eldor 
Magat 
OCL2 Microsoft Windows NT  OAPIW OAPIWEB  
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Name OS Dept Domain Description Admin 
Server 4.0 EB 
IT003477 Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS 
Python Web 
Management Stacy Laabs 
GREYFIN Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0 NOC NPGS RAS 
Lonna 
Sherwin 
LAFAYETTE Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server 
Special 
Projects NPGS Remedy Server Alan Pires 
DIANA Unix/Linux  NPGS Samba  
ERIS Unix/Linux  NPGS Samba  
MISSAS Microsoft Windows 2000 Server EWS NPGS SAS Server 
David 
Wang 
OTTER Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS SMS Server Bob Sharp 
CAPABLE Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server 
Special 
Projects NPGS SQL Alan Pires 
MC01BDB Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server 
Special 
Projects NPGS SQL 2000 Alan Pires 




Development Alan Pires 
Bullnose Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  
NPSEXT
RA Web Servers 
Charles 
Taylor 
Seawolf Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS Web Servers Chris Abila 
RANGER Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS Web Testing Chris Abila 
FIFE Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0 EWS NPGS WINS 
Eldor 
Magat 
ACSAPPS Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server ACS NPGS   
AIRBORNE Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server  MOVES   
ATLANTIS Unix  NPGS   
AUTONOMY Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server  NPGS   




Name OS Dept Domain Description Admin 
BEEHIVE Windows 2000 Advanced Server     
BOA Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server  NPGS   
BOXER Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server  NPGS   
BRINK01 Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  NPGS   
CASCADE Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  NPGS   
CEESERVER Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  NPGS   
CHIMERA Windows 2000 Server     
COLE Windows 2000 Advanced Server     
CYPRESS Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  SAAM   
D68RWX11 Microsoft Windows 2000 Server     
DLRC_SERVE
R 
Microsoft Windows 2000 
Advanced Server DLRC NPGS   
DLRC-
SERVER2 
Microsoft Windows 2000 
Advanced Server DLRC NPGS   
DRCAFENT Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0  
DRCAF
EWG   
DRMI135 Microsoft Windows 2000 Server DRMI NPGS  Steve Hurst 
DRMI159 Unix DRMI   Steve Hurst 
DRMIMAIN Microsoft Windows 2000 Server DRMI NPGS  Steve Hurst 
DRMISQL Windows 2000 Advanced Server    Steve Hurst 
ELO      
ESLLAB Windows 2000 Server  NPGS  Greg Pierson 
EUROPA Microsoft Windows 2000  NPGS   
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Name OS Dept Domain Description Admin 
Server 
EVANGELION Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  NPGS   
EXEC1 Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server File NPGS  
Eldor 
Magat 
EXEC2 Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server Exchange NPGS  
Eldor 
Magat 
GL-ADMIN Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server  NPGS   
IAGO Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  MOVES   
IJWA Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  NPGS   
IJWAS01 Windows 2000 Server     
IS~RANGER Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  NPGS   
IT003584 Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  WORKGROUP  
ITAPSSERVER   NPGS   
KNOX-
LIBRARY--- 






KNXSPT Windows 2003 Server Enterprise Edition    
KNOX 
LIBRARY 
knxsql Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server 
KNOX 
LIBRARY NPGS  
KNOX 
LIBRARY 
KNXUP1 Windows 2003 Server Enterprise Edition    
KNOX 
LIBRARY 
KNXUP2 Windows 2003 Server Enterprise Edition    
KNOX 
LIBRARY 
KNXWWW Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server 
KNOX 
LIBRARY NPGS  
KNOX 
LIBRARY 
libra Unix     
LRCAPPS Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server ACS NPGS   
M058802 Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  NPGS   
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Name OS Dept Domain Description Admin 
M076699 Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  NPGS   
MAGOG Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server  NPGS   
MARINES Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0  NPGS   
MARLIN Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  
MARLI
N-WG   
MC01BAPP Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server Special Projects  Alan Pires 
MC01BEMS Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server Special Projects  Alan Pires 
METRICSSRV Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server  
METRIC
S   
MIAMI Windows 2000 Advanced Server    
Charles 
Taylor 
MONITOR Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  NPGS   
MOTHRA Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server  NPGS   
NETPLOT Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0  NPGS   
NHSERVER Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  NPGS   
NPSUPDATER Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server EWS NPGS  
Greg 
Pierson 
ORION Microsoft Windows 2000 Server     
PEACH Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  SAAM   
Penguin UNIX    Eldor Magat 
RAVEN Windows 2000 Advanced Server    Bob Sharp 
REPUBLIC Windows 2003 Server Enterprise Edition     
Scorpion NAS Box    Homeland 
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Name OS Dept Domain Description Admin 
SCOTTY Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server  NPGS   
SEABEEONE Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server  NPGS   
SP433LAB22 Unix     
SRVSA22 Microsoft Windows 2000 Server  NPGS   
TERRA Microsoft Windows 2000 Server     
TURTLE4 Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server  SECAPS   
W2KSVR-I380 Microsoft Windows 2000 Server     
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APPENDIX B.  BASELINE FIREWALL SETTINGS 
Policy Conditions No. Service  Port Protocol 
In Out In Out 
Comments 




2. Must be server-
side and client-side 










4. At a minimum, 
the Handheld 
Device must be 
connected to the 
Blackberry MS 
Exchange Enterprise 
Server Version 2.1 
Service Pack 3 or 
greater and have 
desktop version 5.16 
or greater. 
 
2. CITRIX 1494 TCP Denied Cond. Denied 1. Must use CITRIX 
ICA Thin Client. 
 
2. Must use 128-bit 
encryption. 
 






3. DISA SWA* 9023 TCP Denied Cond. Denied 1. Must be SSL 
enabled. 
 





*    SWA = Secure 
Web Access  
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Policy Conditions No. Service  Port Protocol 
In Out In Out 
Comments 
4. DISA SWA* 9024 TCP Denied Cond. Denied 1. Must be SSL 
enabled. 
 





*   SWA = Secure 
Web Access  
5. DISA SWA* 9025 TCP Denied Cond. Denied 1. Must be SSL 
enabled. 
 





*  SWA = Secure 
Web Access  
6. DISA SWA* 9026 TCP Denied Cond. Denied 1. Must be SSL 
enabled. 
 





*  SWA = Secure 
Web Access  
7. DNS 53 UDP, 
TCP 
Denied Cond. Denied 1. Permitted through 
firewall via a split 
DNS architecture. 
1. Inbound DNS 
queries to be 
handled by external 
server in split DNS 
configuration.  No 
inbound external 






TCP Denied Cond. Denied 1. Application proxy 
required if available. 
 
9. FTPS 989,  
990 
 
TCP Cond. Cond. 1.  Must be SSL 
enabled. 
 
2.  Minimum 
authentication 
requirement is 
utilization of SSL’s 




be done using DoD 
PKI certificates. 
 
3.   Must use IP 
filtering to host IP 
address.  
 
4.  Not permitted for 
use with Sensitive 
Information.    
1. Must be SSL 
enabled. 
 
2.  Not permitted for 
use with Sensitive 
Information. 









Policy Conditions No. Service  Port Protocol 
In Out In Out 
Comments 
10. HTTP 80 TCP Denied Cond. Denied 1. Application proxy 
required. 
1. A filter may be 
integrated to prevent 
the accessing of 
objectionable sites 




intended to be 
publicly available 
should be placed on 
a public HTTP 
server on the outside 
of the firewall. 
11. HTTPS 443 TCP Cond. Cond. 1.  Only to authorized 
servers with DoD 






utilization of SSL’s 




must be done using 
DoD PKI certificates.
 
3.Must use IP 
filtering to host IP 
address. 
 





1. Application proxy 
required. 
1. Information 
intended to be 
publicly available 




12. IMAPS 993 TCP Cond. Cond. 1. Certificate 
verification through 
DoD PKI certificate 
authority. 
 
2.  Restricted by 
source and 
destination IP. 




Policy Conditions No. Service  Port Protocol 







Cond. Cond. 1. Authorized ONLY 
if VPN meets 
conditions of Para 
6.2.3 or 6.2.4 of 
UTNProtect Policy.  
2. Source/Destination 
IP filtering required. 
 
1.  Authorized 
ONLY if  VPN 
meets conditions of 





IP filtering required. 
1. CNO / CNNWC 
approval is required, 
prior to 
configuration/use, of 
VPNs that DO NOT 
meet the conditions 
of para 6.2.3 or 6.2.4 
of the UTNProtect 
Policy. See Section 
6 (paras 6.3.1 and 
6.3.2) for further 
information.  







CNO N61C4 / 
CNNWC, or PMW 
161 POC for further 
information. 
1. Restricted by 
source and 
destination IP.  
 






DoD PKI certificate 
authority. 





16. Lotus Notes 1352 TCP Cond. Cond. 1. Use restricted by 
server source and 
destination IP. 
1. Use restricted by 





N/A IP 055, 
IP 029 
Cond. Cond. 1. Usage restricted by 
NES to NES source 
and destination IP. 
1. Usage restricted 




18. NNTP 119 TCP Denied Cond. Denied 1. Outbound NNTP 
requests are proxied 
through the firewall 
to external servers.  
  




1. A filter may be 







Policy Conditions No. Service  Port Protocol 
In Out In Out 
Comments 
19. NNTPS 563 TCP Denied Cond. Denied 1. Must be SSL 
enabled. 
 
2.  Outbound 
NNTPS requests are 
proxied through the 
firewall to external 
servers. 
 




1. A filter may be 





20. NTP 123 UDP Denied Cond. Denied 1. For Navy NOCs 
only. 
 





IP filtering required.  
 




1.  As NOCs are the 
only authorized 
users of this service 
across the Navy 
boundary, internal 
users will synch with 
the internal timing 







TCP Cond. Cond. 1. Requires ORACLE 
8.x or greater. 
 
2. Requires an 
ORACLE application 
proxy at the firewall 
if available. 
 
3. Oracle Names 
Server use is not 
permitted. 
1. Requires 
ORACLE 8.x or 
greater. 
 
2. Requires an 
ORACLE 
application proxy at 
the firewall if 
available.  
 
3. Oracle Names 
Server use is not 
permitted. 
 
4. Destination IP 
filtering required. 
1. As of 1 Jun 2004, 
only Oracle 8.1.6 is 
FIPS compliant.  
FIPS compliant 
version is required 




2. An alternative to 
port 1521/firewall 
proxy is to use 
ORACLE 8i with 
the Advanced 
Security Option for 
SSL encapsulation. 
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Policy Conditions No. Service  Port Protocol 




Navy – DoD 
Only 
1601 TCP Denied Cond. Denied 1. Only for use 
between Navy and 
DoD systems.  Intra 
Navy systems must 









ORACLE 8.x or 
greater. 
 
3. Requires an 
ORACLE 
application proxy at 
the firewall if 
available.  
 
4. Oracle Names 
Server use is not 
permitted. 
 
5. Destination IP 
filtering required. 
1. As of 1 Jun 2004, 
only Oracle 8.1.6 is 
FIPS compliant.  
FIPS compliant 
version is required 
for use with 
Sensitive 
Information. 
23. OSPF  IP89 Cond. Cond. 1. Fleet NOC use 
only. 
1. Fleet NOC use 
only. 
1. OSPF is allowed 
for Fleet NOC use 
only. 
 
2. Due to movement 
of ships, limited 
dynamic routing is 
required through the 




external BGP to 
external systems. 
Inbound routing 
information will not 
be allowed. The 
bastion host will run 
the gated daemon 
minimized for OSPF 
only and augmented 
with MD5 
authentication to the 
inner and outer 
routers.  
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Policy Conditions No. Service  Port Protocol 
In Out In Out 
Comments 
24. PPTP 1723 TCP, 
IP47 
Denied Denied Denied Denied **NOTE:  
SPECIAL CASE: 
PPTP is permitted 
for DEERS/ 










25 TCP Cond. Cond. 1. Both inbound and 
outbound mail will be 
processed by a 
firewall proxy or 
equivalent.  
 
2. Malicious code 
scanner required. 
1. Both inbound and 
outbound mail will 
be processed by a 
firewall proxy or 
equivalent. 
 
2. Outbound email 





be applied to the 
extent possible. 
26. SSH 22 TCP Cond. Cond. 1. Permitted only on 
a case-by-case basis 
by local Trusted 
Network DAA. 
 
2. Must use SSH 
Protocol 2 or greater. 
 
3. Allowed for Secure 
FTP and TELNET 
services only. Disable 
forwarding and 
tunneling.   
 









1. Must use SSH 
Protocol 2 or 
greater. 
 
2. Allowed for 




tunneling.   
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Policy Conditions No. Service  Port Protocol 






9000 TCP Cond. Cond. 1. Only to servers 







utilization of SSL’s 




must be done using 
DoD PKI certificates.
 
3. Must use IP 
filtering to host IP 
address.  
 





1. Only to servers 
with DoD PKI 





28. X.400 102 TCP Cond. Cond. 1. This service is 






2. Inbound:  Allowed 
only to authorized 
DMS servers. 
1. This service is 






2. Outbound: NAT 
off.  
 
29. X.500 104, 
17003 
TCP Cond. Cond. 1. This service is 






2. Allowed only to 
authorized DMS 
servers. 
1. This service is 






2. NAT off. 
 
3. Proxy required. 
1. This service is 





30. X.500 SSL 105, 
17004 
TCP Cond. Cond. 1. This service is 




2. Proxy required. 
 
3. Port use must 
include SSL and DoD 
PKI certificates. 
1. This service is 




2. Proxy required. 
 
3. Port use must 
include SSL and 
DoD PKI 
certificates. 
1. Service restricted 
to use by DMS sites 
migrating from 
X.500 to X.500 SSL.
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APPENDIX C.  POSSIBLE VULNERABILITIES 













Various PDF viewers 
including Adobe Acrobat 
5.06 and Xpdf 1.01 allow 
remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary 
commands via shell meta 
characters in an embedded 
hyperlink. 
High Medium Medium 
Apache Web Server 
Apache 1.3 before 1.3.30, 
when running big-endian 
64-bit platforms, does not 
properly parse 
Allow/Deny rules using IP 
addresses without a 
netmask, which could 
allow remote attackers to 
bypass intended access 
restrictions. 
High Low Low 
Apache Web Server 
The mod_alias and 
mod_rewrite modules of 
Apache fail to perform 
adequate boundary 
condition checking. A 
configuration file 
containing a regular 
expression of 9 capturing 
parentheses will trigger a 
buffer overflow allowing 
arbitrary data to be written 
to memory and executed. 
Local attackers able to 
create specially crafted 
files on the host can 
execute arbitrary 
commands on the targeted 
host. This problem was 
detected by matching the 
Apache banner to the list 
of affected Apache 
versions. 
High High High 
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Apache Web Server 
Cross-site scripting (XSS) 
vulnerability in Apache 
allows remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary web 
script and steal cookies via 
a URL with encoded 
newlines followed by a 
request to a .jsp file whose 
name contains the script. 
Medium High Low 
Apache Web Server 
mod_digest for Apache 
does not properly verify 
the nonce of a client 
response by using a 
AuthNonce secret. 
Medium Low Low 
Apache Web Server 
The mod_SSL add on 
module for the Apache 
Web server provides 
Secure Sockets Layer 
functionality.  A buffer 
used by the 
ssl_compat_directive() 
function of mod_SSL is 
vulnerable to overflow 
when processing .htaccess 
files. This type of file is 
designed to provide access 
control policies for Web 
site users, and can be user 
defined if the 
“AllowOverride” Apache 
configuration variable has 
been set. The overflow can 
be triggered by setting the 
DATE_LOCALE variable 
to 10000 or more bytes. 
The excess data will be 
written to memory and 
processed by the host. 
Remote attackers can craft 
special .htaccess files, 
allowing them to execute 
arbitrary commands on 
targeted hosts. 
High Low Medium 
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The jail_attach system call 
in FreeBSD 5.1 and 5.2 
changes the directory of a 
calling process even if the 
process doesn't have 
permission to change 
directory, which allows 
local users to gain 
read/write privileges to 
files and directories within 
another jail. 
High Medium High 
BSD FreeBSD OpenBSD 
Off-by-one error in the 
fb_realpath() function, as 
derived from the realpath 
function in BSD, may 
allow attackers to execute 
arbitrary code, as 
demonstrated in wu-ftpd 
2.5.0 through 2.6.2 via 
commands that cause 
pathnames of length 
MAXPATHLEN+1 to 
trigger a buffer overflow, 
including (1) STOR, (2) 
RETR, (3) APPE, (4) 
DELE, (5) MKD, (6) 
RMD, (7) STOU, or (8) 
RNTO. 





The shmat system call in 
the System V Shared 
Memory interface for 
FreeBSD 5.2 and earlier, 
NetBSD 1.3 and earlier, 
and OpenBSD 2.6 and 
earlier, does not properly 
decrement a shared 
memory segment's 
reference count when the 
vm_map_find function 
fails, which could allow 
local users to gain read or 
write access to a portion of 
kernel memory and gain 
privileges. 
High Low High 
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OpenBSD kernel 3.3 and 
3.4 allows local users to 
cause a denial of service 
(kernel panic) and 
possibly execute arbitrary 
code in 3.4 via a program 
with an invalid header that 
is not properly handled by 
(1) ibcs2_exec.c in the 
iBCS2 emulation 
(compat_ibcs2) or (2) 
exec_elf.c, which leads to 
a stack-based buffer 
overflow. 
Medium Low Medium 
BSD XFree86 
Multiple unknown 
vulnerabilities in XFree86 
4.1.0 to 4.3.0, related to 
improper handling of font 
files. 
Medium Medium Medium 
BSD XFree86 
Buffer overflow in the 
ReadFontAlias function in 
XFree86 4.1.0 to 4.3.0, 
when using the 
CopyISOLatin1Lowered 
function, allows local or 
remote authenticated users 
to execute arbitrary code 
via a malformed entry in 
the font alias (font.alias) 
file. 
High Low Medium 
BSD XFree86 
Buffer overflow in 
ReadFontAlias from 
dirfile.c of XFree86 4.1.0 
through 4.3.0 allows local 
users and remote attackers 
to execute arbitrary code 
via a font alias file 
(font.alias) with a long 
token. 
High Low Medium 
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Multiple integer overflows 
in the font libraries for 
XFree86 4.3.0 allow local 
or remote attackers to 
cause a denial of service 
or execute arbitrary code 
via heap-based and stack-
based buffer overflow 
attacks. 







(CMF) 2.1 and earlier 
allows the guest user to 
gain administrative 
privileges via a certain 
POST request to 
com.cisco.nm.cmf.servlet.
CsAuthServlet, possibly 
involving the “cmd” 
parameter with a 
modifyUser value and a 
modified “privileges” 
parameter. 







(CMF) 2.1 and earlier 
allows the guest user to 
obtain restricted 
information and possibly 
gain administrative 
privileges by changing the 
“guest” user to the Admin 
user on the Modify or 
delete users pages. 
High High High 
Cisco IOS 
Buffer overflow in the 
HTTP server for Cisco 
IOS 12.2 and earlier 
allows remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via 
an extremely long (2GB) 
HTTP GET request.  This 
allows an attacker to be 
able to execute commands 
to view and modify 
configuration data. 
High High High 
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Multiple vulnerabilities in 
the H.323 protocol 
implementation for Cisco 
IOS 11.3T through 12.2T 
allow remote attackers to 
cause a denial of service 
and possibly execute 
arbitrary code, as 
demonstrated by the 
NISCC/OUSPG PROTOS 
test suite for the H.225 
protocol. 
High Low Medium 
Cisco Personal Assistant 
Cisco Personal Assistant 
1.4(1) and 1.4(2) disables 
password authentication 
when “Allow Only Cisco 
CallManager Users” is 
enabled and the Corporate 
Directory settings refer to 
the directory service being 
used by Cisco 
CallManager, which 
allows remote attackers to 
gain access with a valid 
username. 
High High High 
IBM DB2 
Stack-based buffer 
overflow in IBM DB2 
Universal Data Base 7.2 
before Fixpak 10 and 10a, 
and 8.1 before Fixpak 2, 
allows attackers with 
“Connect” privileges to 
execute arbitrary code via 
a LOAD command. 
High Low Medium 
Linksys EtherFast Router 
VPN Server module in 
Linksys EtherFast 
BEFVP41 Router before 
1.40.1 reduces the key 
lengths for keys that are 
supplied via manual key 
entry, which makes it 
easier for attackers to 
crack the keys. 
High Low High 
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SNMP service in Atmel 
802.11b VNET-B Access 
Point 1.3 and earlier, as 
used in Netgear ME102 
and Linksys WAP11, 
accepts arbitrary 
community strings with 
requested MIB 
modifications, which 
allows remote attackers to 
obtain sensitive 
information such as WEP 
keys, cause a denial of 
service, or gain access to 
the network. 
High High High 
Microsof
t Access 2003 
Buffer overflow in the 
ActiveX control for 
Microsoft Access 
Snapshot Viewer for 
Access 2003 allows 
remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via 
long parameters to the 
control. 
High High High 
Microsof
t ASP.Net 
Microsoft ASP.Net 1.1 
allows remote attackers to 
bypass the Cross-Site 
Scripting (XSS) and Script 
Injection protection 
feature via a null character 
in the beginning of a tag 
name. 
High Low Low 
Microsof
t Excel 2003 
Microsoft Excel 2003 
allows remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via 
a spreadsheet with a 
malicious XLM (Excel 4) 
macro that bypasses the 
macro security model. 
Low Medium Low 
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Cross-site scripting (XSS) 
vulnerability in the HTML 
encoding for the Compose 
New Message form in 
Microsoft Exchange 
Server 5.5 Outlook Web 
Access (OWA) allows 
remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary web 
script. 







The Internet Mail Service 
in Exchange Server 5.5 
and Exchange 2000 allows 
remote attackers to cause a 
denial of service (memory 
exhaustion) by directly 
connecting to the SMTP 
service and sending a 
certain extended verb 
request, possibly 
triggering a buffer 
overflow in Exchange 
2000. 
Medium Medium Medium 
Microsof
t FrontPage 
Buffer overflow in the 
debug functionality in 
fp30reg.dll of Microsoft 
FrontPage Server 
Extensions 2000 and 2002 
allows remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via 
a certain chunked encoded 
request. 





Internet Explorer 6 SP1 
allows remote attackers to 
direct drag and drop 
behaviors and other mouse 
click actions to other 
windows by using method 
caching (SaveRef) to 
access the 
window.moveBy method, 
which is otherwise 
inaccessible, a.k.a. “Hijack 
Click V.2”. 
Low Low Low 
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Explorer allows remote 
attackers to bypass 
intended cookie access 
restrictions on a web 
application via “%2e%2e” 
(encoded dot dot) 
directory traversal 
sequences in a URL, 
which causes Internet 
Explorer to send the 
cookie outside the 
specified URL subsets, 
e.g. to a vulnerable 
application that runs on 
the same server as the 
target application. 





Internet Explorer 6 SP1 
and earlier allows remote 
attackers to direct drag and 
drop behaviors and other 
mouse click actions to 
other windows by calling 
the window.moveBy 
method, a.k.a. Hijack 
Click. 





Internet Explorer allows 
remote attackers to bypass 
zone restrictions to inject 
and execute arbitrary 
programs by creating a 
popup window and 
inserting ActiveX object 
code with a “data” tag 
pointing to the malicious 
code, which Internet 
Explorer treats as HTML 
or Javascript, but later 
executes as an HTA 
application, as exploited 





High Low High 
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Internet Explorer 6 SP1 
and earlier allows remote 
attackers to bypass zone 
restrictions by (1) using 
the NavigateAndFind 
method to load a file: URL 
containing Javascript, as 
demonstrated by 
NAFfileJPU, (2) using the 
window.open method to 
load a file: URL 
containing Javascript, as 
demonstrated using 
WsOpenFileJPU, (3) 
setting the href property in 
the base tag for the 
_search window, as 
demonstrated using 
WsBASEjpu, (4) loading 
the search window into an 
Iframe, as demonstrated 
using WsFakeSrc, (5) 
caching a javascript: URL 
in the browser history, 
then accessing that URL in 
the same frame as the 






RefBack, a.k.a. the “Script 
URLs Cross Domain” 
vulnerability. 





Internet Explorer 5.01 
through 6 SP1 allows 
remote attackers to bypass 
zone restrictions and read 
arbitrary files via an XML 
object. 
Low Low Low 
99 
















Internet Explorer 6 SP1 
and earlier allows remote 
attackers to bypass zone 
restrictions and execute 
Javascript by setting the 
window's “href” to the 
malicious Javascript, then 
calling 
execCommand(“Refresh”) 
to refresh the page, aka 
BodyRefreshLoadsJPU or 
the “ExecCommand Cross 
Domain” vulnerability. 





Internet Explorer 6 SP1 
allows remote attackers to 
bypass zone restrictions 
via a javascript protocol 
URL in a sub-frame, 
which is added to the 
history list and executed in 
the parent's top window's 
zone when the 
history.back (back) 
function is called, as 
demonstrated by 
BackToFramedJpu. 





Internet Explorer 6, and 
possibly other versions, 
allows remote attackers to 
spoof the domain of a 
URL via a “%01” 
character before an @ sign 
in the user@domain 
portion of the URL, which 
hides the rest of the URL, 
including the real site, in 
the address bar. 
Medium Medium Medium 
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Internet Explorer 5.01 
through 6.0 does not 
properly handle object 
tags returned from a Web 
server during XML data 
binding, which allows 
remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via 
an HTML e-mail message 
or web page. 





Buffer overflow in 
Internet Explorer 6 SP1 
for certain languages that 
support double-byte 
encodings (e.g., Japanese) 
allows remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via 
the Type property of an 
Object tag. 





Buffer overflow in the 
BR549.DLL ActiveX 
control for Internet 
Explorer 5.01 SP3 through 
6.0 SP1 allows remote 
attackers to execute 
arbitrary code. 





Internet Explorer 5.01 SP3 
through 6.0 SP1 does not 
properly determine object 
types that are returned by 
web servers, which could 
allow remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via 
an object tag with a data 
parameter to a malicious 
file hosted on a server that 
returns an unsafe Content-
Type, a.k.a. the “Object 
Type” vulnerability. 
High Medium High 
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Internet Explorer 6 SP1 
and earlier allows remote 
attackers to bypass zone 
restrictions and read 
arbitrary files by (1) 
modifying the 
createTextRange method 




Linkiller, or (2) modifying 
the createRange method 
and using the FIND dialog 
to select text, as 
demonstrated using 
Findeath, a.k.a. the 
“Function Pointer 
Override Cross Domain” 
vulnerability. 






Buffer overflow in the 
Microsoft Message Queue 
Manager (MSQM) allows 
remote attackers to cause a 
denial of service (RPC 
service crash) via a queue 
registration request. 





The MHTML protocol 
handler in Microsoft 
Outlook Express 5.5 SP2 
through Outlook Express 6 
SP1 allows remote 
attackers to bypass domain 
restrictions and execute 
arbitrary code, as 
demonstrated on Internet 
Explorer using script in a 
compiled help (CHM) file 
that references the 
InfoTech Storage (ITS) 
protocol handlers such as 
(1) ms-its, (2) ms-itss, (3) 
its, or (4) 
mk:@MSITStore, a.k.a. 
the “MHTML URL 
Processing Vulnerability.” 
Medium Low Low 
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Express does not 
sufficiently filter 
parameters of mailto: 
URLs when using them as 
arguments when calling 
OUTLOOK.EXE, which 
allows remote attackers to 
use script code in the 
Local Machine zone and 
execute arbitrary 
programs. 
High Medium High 
Microsof
t SQL Server 
Microsoft SQL Server 
before Windows 2000 SP4 
allows local users to gain 
privileges as the SQL 
Server user by calling the 
xp_fileexist extended 
stored procedure with a 
named pipe as an 
argument instead of a 
normal file. 
High Low High 
Microsof
t SQL Server 
Microsoft SQL server is a 
enterprise level database. 
Often due to SQL database 
installation complexity, 
many users use the default 
system administrator 
username with no 
password for 
authentication. This error 
can lead to a remote 
attacker controlling your 
entire database including 
any customer information 
such as credit card 
numbers, home phones, 
addresses, etc. 
High High High 
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SQL Server and MSDE 
fail to properly validate 
requests on certain LPC 
ports. A specially formed 
packet sent to an LPC port 
can overflow an allocated 
buffer. Data outside the 
buffer range will be placed 
into memory and 
executed. A local attacker 
with limited access can 
escalate their privileges on 
targeted hosts by 
triggering the overflow to 
execute code within the 
security context of the 
SQL Server account. 





A flaw in the 
authentication methods 
used by SQL Server and 
MSDE allow a named pipe 
session to be hijacked. 
Once a local attacker has 
gained control of the 
named pipe they can then 
execute the same 
commands as the client 
authenticating through that 
specific named pipe. If 
access privileges are 
higher, arbitrary SQL 
commands can be 
executed. 
High High High 
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t Visual Basic 
Visual Basic for 
Applications (VBA), 
which is used to run 
scripts in Microsoft Office 
applications, fails to 
perform adequate 
boundary condition 
checking when opening 
documents and allows an 
allocated buffer to be 
overrun. Data outside of 
the buffer will be written 
to memory and executed. 
Remote attackers can 
create malicious Office 
documents to trigger the 
overflow and execute 
arbitrary code on targeted 
hosts. A user would have 
to open the document for 
the code to be executed. 





The Utility Manager in 
Microsoft Windows 2000 
executes winhlp32.exe 
with system privileges, 
which allows local users to 
execute arbitrary code via 
a “Shatter” style attack 
using Windows messages, 
as demonstrated using the 
File Open dialog in the 
Help window. 






A buffer overflow in 
Troubleshooter ActiveX 
Control (Tshoot.ocx) in 
Microsoft Windows 2000, 
SP4 and earlier allows 
remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via 
an HTML formatter e-mail 
or web page. 
High Medium Medium 
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Windows XP allows local 
users to execute arbitrary 
programs by creating a 
task at an elevated 
privilege level through the 
eventtriggers.exe 
command-line tool or the 











The component for the 
Virtual DOS Machine 
(VDM) subsystem in 
Windows NT 4.0 and 
Windows 2000 does not 
properly validate system 
structures, which allows 
local users to access 
protected kernel memory 
and execute arbitrary code. 








function in the 
programming interface for 
the Local Descriptor Table 
(LDT) in Windows NT 4.0 
and Windows 2000 allows 
local attackers to gain 
access to kernel memory 
and execute arbitrary code 
via an expand-down data 
segment descriptor that 
points to protected 
memory. 







The Windows Internet 
Naming Service (WINS) 
for Microsoft Windows 
Server 2003, and possibly 
Windows NT, does not 
properly validate the 
length of certain packets, 
which allows attackers to 
cause a denial of service 
and possibly execute 
arbitrary code. 
High High High 
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Help and Support Center 
in Microsoft Windows XP 
and Windows Server 2003 
SP1 does not properly 
validate HCP URLs, 
which allows remote 
attackers to execute 
arbitrary code, as 
demonstrated using certain 
hcp:// URLs that access 
the DVD Upgrade 
capability (dvdupgrd.htm). 








overflow in the PCHealth 
system in the Help and 
Support Center function in 
Windows XP and 
Windows Server 2003 
allows remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via 
a long query in an HCP 
URL. 









Unknown vulnerability in 
the H.323 protocol 
implementation in 
Windows 2000, Windows 
XP, and Windows Server 
2003 allows remote 
attackers to execute 
arbitrary code. 









The Negotiate Security 
Software Provider (SSP) 
interface in Windows 
2000, Windows XP, and 
Windows Server 2003, 
allows remote attackers to 
cause a denial of service 
(crash from null 
dereference) or execute 





High Medium Medium 
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Multiple integer overflows 
in Microsoft ASN.1 
library (MSASN1.DLL), 
as used in LSASS.EXE, 
CRYPT32.DLL, and other 
Microsoft executables and 
libraries on Windows NT 
4.0, 2000, and XP, allow 
remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via 
ASN.1 BER encodings 
with very large length 
fields that cause arbitrary 
heap data to be 
overwritten. 









Buffer overflow in the 
rendering for (1) Windows 
Metafile (WMF) or (2) 
Enhanced Metafile (EMF) 
image formats in 
Microsoft Windows NT 
4.0 SP6a, 2000 SP2 
through SP4, and XP 
SP1allows remote 
attackers to execute 
arbitrary code via a 
malformed WNF or EMF 
image. 









A multi-threaded race 
condition in the Windows 
RPC DCOM functionality 
with the MS03-039 patch 
installed allows remote 
attackers to cause a denial 
of service (crash or reboot) 
by causing two threads to 
process the same RPC 
request, which causes one 
thread to use memory after 
it has been freed, as 
demonstrated by certain 
exploits against those 
vulnerabilities. 
High Medium High 
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Buffer overflow in the 
SMB capability for 
Microsoft Windows XP, 
2000, and NT allows 
remote attackers to cause a 
denial of service and 
possibly execute arbitrary 
code via an SMB packet 
that specifies a smaller 
buffer length than is 
required. 












overflow in a logging 
function for Windows 
Workstation Service 
(WKSSVC.DLL) allows 
remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via 
RPC calls that cause long 
entries to be written to a 
debug log file 
(“NetSetup.LOG”), as 
demonstrated using the 
NetAddAlternateCompute
rName API. 











Microsoft Data Access 
Components (MDAC) 
provide connectivity 
between Windows clients 
and various different data 
source types.  The MDAC 
components have an 
unchecked buffer in the 
function that handles 
replies to SQL broadcast 
requests. The buffer 
overflow allows attackers 
to execute arbitrary code 
on systems that create 
SQL broadcast requests to 
discover SQL servers. 
Attackers can exploit this 
vulnerability by hosting a 
malicious SQL server that 
responds with malformed 
SQL/MDAC responses to 
the requesting machine. 
High Low High 
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The Microsoft ASN.1 
library is used to pass 
messages in a variety of 
protocols such as SNMP 
and NTLMv2.  A 
malformed ASN.1 
message can lead to the 
exploitation of a remote 
code execution flaw on a 
variety of Microsoft 
platforms. 











Two DirectX functions 
used to process MIDI 
audio files do not perform 
proper bounds checking 
and are vulnerable to 
buffer overflow atttacks.  
Remote attackers can craft 
a malicious MIDI file to 
distribute from a Web 
server they control. A user 
who views this file from 
one of the affected 
applications will then 
execute the malicious 
content of the file. 
Execution occurs in the 
context of the user 
viewing the file. 
Successful exploitation of 
this vulnerability requires 
that a user download and 
execute the malicious 
media file.  











Multiple integer overflows 
in a Microsoft Windows 
DirectX MIDI library 
(QUARTZ.DLL) allow 
remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via 
a MIDI (.mid) file with (1) 
large length for a Text or 
Copyright string, or (2) a 
large number of tracks, 
which leads to a heap-
based buffer overflow. 
High Low Medium 
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The HTML encoder 
provided by the copy-
paste functionality within 
Microsoft Windows 
contains an exploitable 
buffer overrun.  A buffer 
overflow in the HTML 
encoder can be exploited 
to allow an attacker to 
execute arbitrary code.  
This vulnerability can be 
exploited by an attacker 
who hosts a malicious web 
site that the user views or 
via a malicious HTML-
based email sent to the 
end-user. 












Component Objects Model 
(DCOM) protocol and 
Remote Procedure Call 
(RPC) service are installed 
with many Microsoft 
Windows operating 
systems.  DCOM allows 
the distribution of 
application components 
across multiple servers.  
The RPC service listens on 
TCP port 135, and handles 
DCOM object requests 
sent to the server.  The 
RPC service fails to 
adequately validate 
messages sent to the 
service, allowing a buffer 
to be overrun.  Data 
outside of the buffer will 
be executed on the server 
with SYSTEM user 
privileges.  Remote 
attackers can exploit this 
vulnerability to execute 
arbitrary commands on the 
targeted host. 
High Low High 
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Buffer overflow in a 
certain DCOM interface 
for RPC in Microsoft 
Windows NT 4.0, 2000, 
XP, and Server 2003 
allows remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via 
a malformed message. 











The Microsoft Windows 
Messenger Service 
transmits messages to 
network users and the 
Alerter Service for 
Windows. It is not related 
to the Windows or MSN 
Messenger instant 
messaging applications.  
The Messenger Service 
fails to validate the size of 
messages allowing an 
allocated buffer to be 
overflowed. Data outside 
the buffer will be placed in 
memory and processed 
with SYSTEM level 
privileges or cause the 
service to stop responding. 
Remote attackers can send 
specially crafted messages 
allowing them to execute 
arbitrary code on targeted 
hosts. 












overflow in the 
Distributed Component 
Object Model (DCOM) 
interface in the RPCSS 
Service allows remote 
attackers to execute 
arbitrary code via a 
malformed DCERPC 
DCOM object activation 
request packet with 
modified length fields. 
High Low High 
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Buffer overflow in a 
certain component of 
Microsoft Data Access 
Components (MDAC) 2.5 
through 2.7 allows remote 
attackers to execute 
arbitrary code via a certain 
response to a broadcast 
address. 












capability in Microsoft, 
Windows NT, through 
Server 2003 does not 
prompt the user to 
download and install 
ActiveX controls when the 
system is low on memory, 
which could allow remote 
attackers execute arbitrary 
code without user 
approval. 











Buffer overflow in a 
function in User32.dll on 
Windows NT through 
Server 2003 allows local 
users to execute arbitrary 
code via long (1) LB_DIR 
messages to ListBox or (2) 
CB_DIR messages to 
ComboBox controls in a 
privileged application. 











Buffer overflow in the 
streaming media 
component for logging 
multicast requests in the 
ISAPI for the logging 
capability of Microsoft 
Windows Media Services 
(nsiislog.dll), as installed 
in IIS 5.0, allows remote 
attackers to execute 
arbitrary code via a large 
POST request to 
nsiislog.dll. 
High Low High 
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t Word 2003 
Microsoft Word 2000 does 
not properly check certain 
properties of a document, 
which allows attackers to 
bypass the macro security 
model and automatically 
execute arbitrary macros 
via a malicious document. 





Microsoft Word 2003, and 
Microsoft Works Suites 
2001 through 2004 do not 
properly check the length 
of the “Macro names” data 
value, which could allow 
remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via 
a buffer overflow attack. 





The GUI functionality for 
an interactive session in 
Symantec LiveUpdate 
1.70.x through 1.90.x, as 
used in Norton Internet 
Security 2001 through 
2004, SystemWorks 2001 
through 2004, and 
AntiVirus and Norton 
AntiVirus Pro 2001 
through 2004, AntiVirus 
for Handhelds v3.0, allows 
local users to gain 
SYSTEM privileges. 
High Medium Medium 
Open 
Source Ghostscript 
Unknown vulnerability in 
GNU Ghostscript before 
7.07 allows attackers to 
execute arbitrary 
commands, even when -
dSAFER is enabled, via a 
malicious PostScript file. 
High Low Medium 
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Konqueror Embedded and 
KDE 2.2.2 and earlier 
does not validate the 
Common Name (CN) field 
for X.509 Certificates, 
which could allow remote 
attackers to spoof 
certificates via a man-in-
the-middle attack. 
High High High 
Open 
Source Konqueror 
Buffer overflow in KON 
kon2 0.3.9b and earlier 
allows local users to 
execute arbitrary code via 
a long -Coding command 
line argument. 
High Low High 
Open 
Source Linux 
Integer overflow in the 
ip_setsockopt function in 
Linux kernel 2.4.22 
through 2.4.25 and 2.6.1 
through 2.6.3 allows local 
users to cause a denial of 
service (crash) or executee 
arbitrary code via the 
MCAST_MSFILTER 
socket option. 
High Low High 
Open 
Source Linux 
The mremap system call 
(do_mremap) in Linux 
kernel 2.2, 2.4, and 2.6 
does not properly perform 
bounds checks, which 
allows local users to cause 
a denial of service and 
possibly gain privileges by 
causing a remapping of a 
virtual memory area 
(VMA) to create a zero 
length VMA. 
High Medium High 
Open 
Source Linux 
Buffer overflow in the 
HTTP parser for MPlayer 
1.0pre3 and earlier, 0.90, 
and 0.91 allows remote 
attackers to execute 
arbitrary code via a long 
Location header. 
High Low High 
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The do_mremap function 
for the mremap in Linux 
2.2 to 2.2.25, 2.4 to 2.4.24, 
and 2.6 to 2.6.2, does not 
properly check the return 
value from the 
do_munmap function 
when the maximum 
number of VMA 
descriptors is exceeded, 
which allows local users to 
gain root privileges. 
High Low High 
Open 
Source Linux 
Multiple buffer overflows 
in vfte, based on fte, 
before 0.50, allow local 
users to execute arbitrary 
code. 




overflow in rsync before 
2.5.7, when running in 
server mode, allows 
remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code and 
possibly escape the chroot 
jail. 
High Low High 
Open 
Source Linux 
Multiple buffer overflows 
in (1) iso2022jp.c or (2) 
shiftjis.c for Courier-
IMAP before 3.0.0, 
Courier before 0.45, and 
SqWebMail before 4.0.0 
may allow remote 
attackers to execute 
arbitrary code “when 
Unicode character is out of 
BMP range.” 
High Low High 
Open 
Source Linux 
Format string vulnerability 
in LinuxNode (node) 
before 0.3.2 may allow 
attackers to cause a denial 
of service or execute 
arbitrary code. 
High High High 
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Buffer overflow in 
LinuxNode (node) before 
0.3.2 allows remote 
attackers to execute 
arbitrary code. 
High Low High 
Open 
Source Linux 
Unknown vulnerability in 
the ncp_lookup function 
of ncpfs in Linux 2.1 
allows local users to gain 
privileges. 
High Low Medium 
Open 
Source Linux 
A “flaw in bounds 
checking” in the do_brk 
function for Linux kernel 
2.4.22 and earlier allows 
local users to gain root 
privileges. 
High Low High 
Open 
Source Linux 
The getgrouplist function 
in GNU libc allows may 
attackers to cause a denial 
of service (segmentation 
fault) and execute 
arbitrary code when a user 
is a member of a large 
number of groups, which 
can cause a buffer 
overflow. 
High High High 
Open 
Source Linux 
The RPC code in Linux 
kernel 2.4 sets the reuse 
flag when sockets are 
created, which could allow 
local users to bind to UDP 
ports that are used by 
privileged services such as 
nfsd. 
High Medium Medium 
Open 
Source Linux 
The mxcsr code in Linux 
kernel 2.4 allows attackers 
to modify CPU state 
registers via a malformed 
address. 
High Medium High 
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The Linux 2.0 kernel IP 
stack does not properly 
calculate the size of an 
ICMP citation, which 
causes it to include 
portions of unauthorized 
memory in ICMP error 
responses. 
High Low Medium 
Open 
Source Metamail 
Multiple buffer overflows 
in Metamail 2.7 and 
earlier allow remote 
attackers to execute 
arbitrary code. 
High Low High 
Open 
Source Metamail 
Multiple format string 
vulnerabilities in Metamail 
2.7 and earlier allow 
remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code. 
High Medium Medium 
Open 
Source MySQL 
When installed, MySQL 
enables world-writeable 
files. Using the OUTFILE 
SQL command, attackers 
can overwrite 
configuration files and 
cause the MySQL daemon 
to start with elevated 
privileges. This allows 
remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary actions 
on the targeted host. 
High High High 
Open 
Source MySQL 
Buffer overflow in 
get_salt_from_password 
from sql_acl.cc for 
MySQL 4.0.14 and earlier, 
and 3.23.x, allows 
attackers to execute 
arbitrary code via a long 
Password field 
High Low High 
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MySQL allows authorized 
users to switch to a 




bounds checking allows 
any password greater than 
16 characters that is parsed 
by 
COM_CHANGE_USER 
to cause a buffer overflow 
condition. Arbitrary data 
outside the buffer may be 
executed with elevated 
privileged or cause the 
MySQL daemon (mysqld) 
to crash. This allows 
attackers with access to a 
valid account to cause a 
denial-of-service condition 
or run arbitrary code on 
the targeted host. 
High Low High 
Open 
Source Opera 
Opera allows remote 
attackers to bypass 
intended cookie access 
restrictions on a web 
application via “%2e%2e” 
(encoded dot dot) 
directory traversal 
sequences in a URL, 
which causes Opera to 
send the cookie outside the 
specified URL subsets, 
e.g. to a vulnerable 
application that runs on 
the same server as the 
target application. 
High Medium Medium 
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Samba is an open source 
software suite that 
provides file and print 
services through Server 
Message Block/Common 
Internet File Sharing 
(SMB/CIFS) for UNIX 
and Windows systems.  It 
packaged with most Linux 
distributions.  A portion of 
the Samba source code 
contains insecure coding 
methods that allow a 
buffer to be exceeded.  
The issue lies within the 
call_trans2open function 
in trans2.c that allocates a 
buffer of 1024 bytes.  It is 
possible to write data 
outside the buffer, which 
is then placed on the 
process stack.  This allows 
remote attackers to run 
arbitrary commands on the 
targeted host by 
embedding them in 
specially crafted requests 
to the intended victim. 
High Low High 
Open 
Source tcpdump 
tcpdump before 3.8.1 
allows remote attackers to 
cause a denial of service 
(infinite loop) via certain 
ISAKMP packets. 
High Medium Medium 
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University (WU) FTP 
server package improperly 
processes user input in 
such a way as to allow for 
a remote attacker to 
overwrite one word in 
memory with arbitrary 
data. It is possible to 
exploit this vulnerability 
in order to gain root 
privileges on the target 
system. This attack 
requires an attacker to 
login to the FTP server 
with any valid user 
account including the 
anonymous user account 
prior to exploitation. 
Affected versions of this 
package include WU-
FTPD 2.5.0, 2.6.0 and 
2.6.1. No public exploit 
exists for this vulnerability 
however private exploits 
are believed to exist. 
High Low High 
Sun AnswerBook 
Some versions of Solaris 
include the Sun 
AnswerBook2 
Documentation Server. It 
provides network access to 
the documentation for Sun 
products.  The 
'gettransbitmap' CGI 
component of 
AnswerBook2 does not 
perform adequate 
boundary condition 
checking. Passing a long 
filename argument to the 
gettransbitmap CGI will 
cause an overrun buffer, 
allowing an attacker to 
execute commands on the 
targeted host. 
High Low High 
121 













The Kodak Color 
Management System 
(KCMS) Library is a color 
management API for Sun 
Solaris.  The KCMS 
daemon allows remote 
clients to access color 
profiles stored on the host. 




requests allowing access 
to files outside of the 
/usr/openwin/etc/devdata/p
rofiles or  
/etc/openwin/devdata/profi
les directories. Remote 
attackers can access 
arbitrary files on the host 
be specifying the absolute 
path in the fileName 
argument. This includes 
allowing access to 
/etc/shaddow or 
/etc/passwd with account 
usernames and passwords. 
High Low Medium 
Sun Solaris 
Unknown vulnerability in 
the ls-F builtin function in 
tcsh on Solaris 8 allows 
local users to create or 
delete files as other users, 
and gain privileges. 
High High High 
Sun Solaris 
Unknown multiple 
vulnerabilities in (1) lpstat 
and (2) the libprint library 
in Solaris 2.6 through 9 
may allow attackers to 
execute arbitrary code or 
read or write arbitrary 
files. 
High Medium Medium 
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In Sun Solaris, it is 
possible to identify and 
crash the RPC snmpXdmi 
daemon. This daemon is 
vulnerable to a remote 
buffer overflow that may 
be exploited to gain 
remote root control of the 
target system. 
High Low High 
Sun Solaris 
The ypbind daemon fails 
to perform adequate 
boundary condition 
checking, allowing buffer 
overflows to occur. Data 
outside of the buffer range 
is placed in memory and 
executed by the host with 
root privileges; or it can 
cause the daemon to crash. 
Remote attackers can 
execute arbitrary 
commands on target hosts 
by sending specially-
crafted requests to the 
ypbind service over TCP 
port 111. If the ypbind 
daemon crashes as a result 
of an overflow, subsequent 
NIS lookups will fail 
resulting in a denial-of-
service condition. 
High Low High 
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The Calendar Manager 
RPC daemon is a small 
database manager for 
appointment and resource 
scheduling data. The 
daemon fails to perform 
adequate boundary 
condition checks, 
permitting a buffer 
overflow to occur. Remote 
attackers can exploit the 
buffer overflow to execute 
arbitrary instructions and 
gain root access on 
targeted hosts by sending 
specially-crafted requests 
to the daemon. 
High Low High 
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Remote Procedure Call 
(RPC) is a library for 
inter-process 
communication within a 
system. The xdr_array 
function is standard in all 
Sun RPC 
implementations. XDR 
primitives are routines that 
allow a uniform 
presentation of basic data 
types. The xdr_array filter 
primitive translates 
variable-length arrays.  An 
attacker can pass a large 
number of elements to 
xdr_array, causing a buffer 
overflow condition. This 
allows an attacker to 
execute arbitrary 
commands on the targeted 
host with super-user 
privileges.  Other RPC 
services on many UNIX 
platforms may be 
vulnerable because 
xdr_array is not specific to 
any one service. Any RPC 
service that uses xdr_array 
could be vulnerable. By 
default, RPC services are 
installed and enabled on 
the vulnerable software 
versions. 
High Low High 
Sun Solaris 
Abuffer overflow 
vulnerability exists within 
Sun Solaris snmpdx which 
may allow for an attacker 
gain complete control of 
the target host, and the 
snmpdx daemon is 
installed by default with 
the Sun Solaris operating 
system. 
High Low High 
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The default installation of 
sadmind on Solaris uses 
weak authentication 
(AUTH_SYS), which 
allows local and remote 
attackers to spoof Solstice 
AdminSuite clients and 
gain root privileges via a 
certain sequence of RPC 
packets. 
High Medium High 
Sun Solaris 
Stack-based buffer 
overflow in the runtime 
linker, ld.so.1, on Solaris 
2.6 through 9 allows local 
users to gain root 
privileges via a long 
LD_PRELOAD 
environment variable. 
High Low High 
Sun Solaris 
A buffer overflow 
vulnerability exists within 
many versions of the Unix 
system V based login 
program in how 
environment variables are 
processed. It is possible 
for an attacker to locally 
exploit a vulnerable login 
program or to connect to a 
telnet or rlogin daemon 
that uses a vulnerable 
login program and supply 
specially crafted data that 
allows for remote 
execution of arbitrary code 
on the target system. 
High Low High 
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The cachefsd daemon is 
installed by default on all 
versions of Sun's Solaris 
operating systems. 
Cachefsd is used to cache 
requests for operations on 
remote file systems which 
are mounted using the 
NFS protocol.  The 
problem is due to 
insufficient bounds 
checking on the mounts 
that were supplied by the 
user.  An attacker may 
exploit this vulnerability 
by creating a file and 
having the cachefsd 
process it to gain root 
privileges. 
High Low High 
Sun ToolTalk 
The ToolTalk component 
allows applications to 
communicate via remote 
procedure calls (RPC) 
across different hosts and 
platforms. The ToolTalk 
RPC database is used to 
manage connections 
between ToolTalk 
applications.  The 
_TT_CREATE_FILE 
procedure within the 
ToolTalk RPC database is 
vulnerable to a buffer 
overflow. An attacker may 
exploit this vulnerability 
in order to run attacker 
specified code with the 
privileges of the ToolTalk 
RPC database server. By 
default the ToolTalk 
server runs as root. 
High Low High 
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SuSE Linux Pro 
SuSEconfig.susewm in the 
susewm package on SuSE 
Linux 8.2Pro allows local 
users to overwrite 
arbitrary files via a 
symlink attack on the 
susewm.$$ temporary file. 
High High High 
SuSE Linux Pro 
SuSEconfig.javarunt in the 
javarunt package on SuSE 
Linux 7.3Pro allows local 
users to overwrite 
arbitrary files via a 
symlink attack on the 
.java_wrapper temporary 
file. 
High High High 
Various Telnet daemon 
A vulnerability in many 
vendor-supplied Telnet 
daemons can be exploited 
by sending large amounts 
of data in telnet 
environment variables. By 
doing so, values on the 
heap are overwritten and 
program flow may be 
redirected. 
High Low High 
Various X11 
X11 is a client/server 
protocol. The server 
controls the screen and the 
clients connected to it. The 
client sends several 
requests like drawing a 
window or a menu and the 
server sends back to them 
events such as mouse 
clicks, key strokes. Many 
users have their X Server 
set to xhost +, permitting 
access to the X Server by 
anyone, from anywhere.  
This misconfiguration can 
lead to fairly quick 
compromise by sniffing 
the xterm keystrokes from 
root users. 
High High High 
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The parseaddr.c portion of 
Sendmail is responsible 
for parsing Email 
addresses in SMTP 
headers. The prescan() 
function in parseaddr.c 
fails to perform adequate 
bounds checking, and 
allows an associated 
buffer to be overflowed. A 
special control value in 
this function allows 
boundary condition checks 
to be bypassed. By 
crafting special SMTP 
requests remote attackers 
place arbitrary data on the 
process stack. This data 
will be executed or cause a 
denial-of-service condition 
on the targeted host. 
High Low High 
Various SMTP 
A “potential buffer 
overflow in ruleset 
parsing” for Sendmail 
8.12.9, when using the 
nonstandard rulesets (1) 
recipient (2), final, or (3) 
mailer-specific envelope 
recipients, has unknown 
consequences. 
High Low High 
Various SMTP 
Inadequate boundary 
condition checks in 
Sendmail allow arbitrary 
data to processed by the 
Sendmail daemon. A 
HELO command in excess 
of 1024 characters will 
trigger the overflow, and 
allows remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code on 
the targeted host. The 
popular use of this attack 
is to send SMTP traffic 
from the targeted host, 
thereby disguising the 
actual source. 
High Low High 
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